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“THE INTERNET OF BUILDINGS”: INSURANCE OF 




“I know I've made some very poor decisions recently, but I can 
give you my complete assurance that my work will be back to 





The technological advances of the twenty-first century have led modern 
societies to reap previously unheard of advantages, including the now 
ubiquitous “Internet of Things” (IoT).
2
 IoT refers to the connection of 
ordinary objects to the internet—e.g., smart phones, smart TVs, smart 
                                                                                                                 
 * Thomas D. Hunt is a Risk Management Associate at Robert M. Currey & 
Associates. He is a member of the Massachusetts and Maine bars and a graduate of Suffolk 
University Law School (J.D., 2017, magna cum laude) and Boston University (B.A., 2013). 
For helpful discussions and edits, thank you to Tom Vincent II of the law firm GableGotwals 
as well as the entire staff of the Oklahoma Law Review. 
 1. 2001: A SPACE ODYSSEY (MGM 1968) (statement of a HAL 9000 computer, 
following its malfunction and murder of all but one of the crew of the spacecraft Discovery 
One, and immediately prior to being disconnected by the lone remaining mission pilot, Dave 
Bowman). 
 2. See Harald Bauer, Mark Patel & Jan Veira, The Internet of Things: Sizing Up the 
Opportunity, MCKINSEY & CO. (Dec. 2014), https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/ 
semiconductors/our-insights/the-internet-of-things-sizing-up-the-opportunity (predicting IoT 
will become $6.2 trillion industry by 2025); see also Steven A. Cash, David T. Doot & 
James B. Blackburn IV, The Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) and the Law, DAY PITNEY 
LLP (Sept. 28, 2017), https://www.daypitney.com/insights/publications/2017/09/28-the-
industrial-internet-of-things. As attorneys Cash, Doot, and Blackburn note: 
Most people are now familiar with the Internet of Things (IoT), the network of 
physical objects, embedded sensors, connections and computers that permeates 
much of our everyday life. Encompassing the mundane (smart refrigerators and 
toasters), the vital (medical devices), the amusing (smart toilets) and the creepy 
(tracking and shopping monitors), the IoT has become both a buzzword and a 
way of life. 
Id. IoT has been defined as “the connection of systems and devices with primarily physical 
purposes (e.g., sensing, heating/cooling, lighting, motor actuation, transportation) to 
information networks (including the Internet) via interoperable protocols, often built into 
embedded systems.” U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., STRATEGIC PRINCIPLES FOR SECURING 
THE INTERNET OF THINGS 2 n.1 (2016), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/ 
publications/Strategic_Principles_for_Securing_the_Internet_of_Things-2016-1115-FINAL 
_v2-dg11.pdf. 
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buildings, and soon enough smart cities.
3
 In recent years, commercial real 
estate (CRE) owners, operators, builders, and developers have embraced 
IoT technology by gradually integrating artificial intelligence into the 
critical infrastructural components of buildings.
4
 This helps generate 
advances in data analytics, open up new revenue streams, and ensure long-
term efficiency and sustainability.
5
 Although these developments 
undoubtedly connote progress, it is almost axiomatic that whenever the 
internet and computers become more involved with any aspect of our lives, 
the possibility of a system failure or data breach increases correlatively.
6
 
One prominent professor at Carnegie Mellon University and member of the 
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers opined that “security and 




                                                                                                                 
 3. See WIPRO LTD., SMART BUILDINGS ENABLE SMART CITIES 6 (2016), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20170921111021/http://www.wipro.com/documents/insights/S
mart-Buildings-Enable-Smart-Cities.pdf (noting that the International Data Corporation 
defines “smart building” as “a facility that utilizes advanced automation and integration to 
measure, monitor, control, and optimize operations and maintenance”); see also Michael 
Totty, The Rise of the Smart City, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 16, 2017, 10:12 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-rise-of-the-smart-city-1492395120; Michaela Ross, 
DelBene, Cantwell Introduce Bill to Boost Smart Cities, BLOOMBERG LAW: TECH & 
TELECOM (Oct. 2, 2017) https://www.bna.com/delbene-cantwell-introduce-n73014470444/ 
(discussing H.R. 3895, the Smart Cities and Communities Act of 2017, a bill introduced to 
the House by Rep. Suzan DelBene (D-WA) and Sen. Maria Cantwell (D-WA) aiming to 
infuse $1.1 billion of federal money into Smart Cities Initiative). 
 4. Totty, supra note 3 (discussing sensors being implemented in locations such as 
streetlights and water pipes). 
 5. See ROBERT T. O’BRIEN & SURABHI KEJRIWAL, EVOLVING CYBER RISK IN 
COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE 10 (2015), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/ 
Documents/financial-services/us-fsi-cyber-risk-in-cre-infographic-online-final.pdf; see also 
Wilfrid Donkers, Rising Cyber Risk in Real Estate Through The Rise of Smart Buildings, 
DELOITTE (Jan. 19, 2017), https://www2.deloitte.com/nl/nl/pages/real-estate/articles/rising-
cyber-risk-in-real-estate-through-the-rise-of-smart-buildings.html; see also Alan Mihalic, 
Protecting Smart Buildings from Cyber Attacks, ENGINEERING.COM (Aug. 21, 2017), 
https://www.engineering.com/BIM/ArticleID/15476/Protecting-Smart-Buildings-from-
Cyber-Attacks.aspx. 
 6. See Andrew McGill, The Inevitability of Being Hacked, ATLANTIC (Oct. 28, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/10/we-built-a-fake-web-toaster-and-it-
was-hacked-in-an-hour/505571/ (demonstrating such risk through an experiment wherein a 
“smart toaster” suffered a first hack attempt within an hour of creation). This principle has 
massive implications for the commercial real estate sector, as experts predict 30.7 billion IoT 
devices will be installed in building bases by 2020. Mihalic, supra note 5.  
 7. Jimmy H. Koo, Views on Smart Cities and Indoor Localization from Bruno 
Sinopoli, Associate Professor, Carnegie Mellon University, BLOOMBERG LAW PRIVACY & 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol71/iss2/3
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Some research and analysis has demonstrated that the risks of system 
failures and data breaches (hereinafter, collectively, “cyber events”) are 
especially large for the hotel and retail sectors.
8
 However, cyber events can 
affect all businesses, and especially where entire buildings are becoming 
computerized, no real estate asset is safe from a cyber attack.
9
 This article 
will argue that CRE stakeholders involved across all sectors must weigh the 
costs and benefits of purchasing cyber insurance as part of their larger risk 
management programs, and that the cyber carriers must accordingly tailor 
their products to better benefit CRE insureds. This article explores (1) the 
nature of cyber insurance;
10
 (2) the types of risks that CRE should consider 
when shopping for coverage;
11
 (3) whether such risks are adequately 
covered by other more “traditional” types of insurance;
12
 (4) a concrete 
example of a real estate cyber event and how these principles might apply 
in a real-world scenario;
13
 and ultimately, (5) how CRE stakeholders and 
their insurers should approach the cyber market going forward.
14
   
                                                                                                                 
DATA SECURITY (May 27, 2016), https://www.bna.com/views-smart-cities-n57982073135/. 
Professor Sinopoli elaborated:  
Security is a difficult property to achieve as, unlike in computer networks, 
many devices will be deployed in the field with little physical protection and 
are bound to be tampered with. Several nodes of the network will be low-cost 
and simple, and therefore incapable of running layers of security that require 
more powerful and sophisticated devices. In addition, ICT will support the 
operation of physical systems, some of which may be safety-critical. Attacks, 
either of integrity or denial-of-service, can potentially lead to catastrophic 
consequences, even so far as loss of human life. One such example is 
connected vehicles—one can only imagine what could happen if an attacker 
can wirelessly take control of a number of cars on the road at the same time, as 
was recently demonstrated by the hackers Charlie Miller and Chris Valasek. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
 8. Donkers, supra note 5. See, e.g., Alex Langlinais & Jan Larson, Hotel Malware 
Attack Raises Unusual Insurance Questions, LAW360 (Jan. 11, 2018, 11:53 ET) (citing St. 
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Rosen Millennium Inc., Case No. 6:17-cv-540-ORL-41-GJK, 
2018 WL 4732718 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 28, 2018)) (discussing case involving credit card breach 
at hotel chain). 
 9. See infra Section II.A, Part VI. 
 10. See infra Part II. 
 11. See infra Parts III, IV. 
 12. See infra Part V. 
 13. See infra Part VI. 
 14. See infra Part VII. 
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II. Rise of Cyber Insurance 
A. Nature of the Risk 
The list of recent cyber events in the news is nearly endless—they 
happen on an almost daily basis, such that it now almost seems banal. In 
2017, one of the “Big Three” U.S. credit reporting firms suffered a data 
breach (allegedly resulting from a mistake by a single employee) that 
resulted in the exposure of 146 million Americans’ sensitive personal 
information.
15
 In 2014, the third largest U.S. retailer experienced one that 
saw 40 million credit and debit card records and 70 million other customer 
records stolen, leading to a reported $61 million in related losses to the 
company.
16
 That same year, malware wiped out and exposed for public 
review massive amounts of data from the corporate computers of one of 
Hollywood’s largest film studios in an attack that U.S. officials attribute to 
North Korea.
17
 The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has suggested 
that the very integrity of U.S. elections has been threatened and will 
continue to be threatened by cyber attacks from malevolent foreign actors.
18
 
Reports estimate that cyber-crime costs the global economy over $400 
                                                                                                                 
 15. See Tara Siegel Bernard & Stacy Cowley, Equifax Breach Caused by Lone 
Employee’s Error, Former C.E.O. Says, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes. 
com/2017/10/03/business/equifax-congress-data-breach.html (observing that the breach led 
to the resignation of the firm’s CEO, increased scrutiny from members of the House Energy 
and Commerce Committee, and some significant public outrage); see also Todd Haselton, 
Credit Reporting Firm Equifax Says Data Breach Could Potentially Affect 143 Million U.S. 
Consumers, CNBC (Sept. 8, 2017, 3:25 ET), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/09/07/credit-
reporting-firm-equifax-says-cybersecurity-incident-could-potentially-affect-143-million-us-
consumers.html (noting a twelve percent share price drop in after-hours trading following 
disclosure of the breach). 
 16. Dhanya Skariachan & Jim Finkle, Target Shares Recover After Reassurance of Data 
Breach Impact, REUTERS (Feb. 26, 2014, 6:51 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
2014/02/26/us-target-results-idUSBREA1P0WC20140226. 
 17. David E. Sanger & Nicole Perlroth, U.S. Said to Find North Korea Ordered 
Cyberattack on Sony, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/18/ 
world/asia/us-links-north-korea-to-sony-hacking.html?_r=0. The hackers were eventually 
sanctioned and charged, but not without a high-profile resignation from Sony Pictures co-
chair Amy Pascal. See Dan Mangan & Kate Fazzini, North Korean Hackers Sanctioned, 
Facing Charges for Sony Hack, Wannacry Ransomware Attack, CNBC (Sept. 6, 2018, 10:34 
ET), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/09/06/north-korean-hackers-will-be-charged-for-sony-
pictures-wannacry-ransomware-attacks.html. 
 18. Michael Riley & Jordan Robertson, Russian Cyber Hacks on U.S. Electoral System 









 with one Munich Re subsidiary’s survey finding that 
almost one-third of U.S. businesses suffered a data breach in 2017 alone.
20
 
CRE, for its part, has historically avoided purchasing cyber insurance, 
but as smart buildings, cloud based computing, electronic wire transfers, 
and other “internetizing” phenomena have become more prevalent, CRE 
stakeholders no longer feel so immune from cyber risks, nor should they.
21
 
In the past, CRE owners may have rested assured that much of the risk 
surrounding cyber events was borne with their tenants or property 
managers. Because the tenants and property managers were the entities 
actually operating whatever computer or digital technology existed at the 
premises, together with storing any related data, any liability arising 
                                                                                                                 
 19. CENTRE FOR STRATEGIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, NET LOSSES: ESTIMATING THE 
GLOBAL COST OF CYBERCRIME 2 (2014), https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-
public/legacy_files/files/attachments/140609_rp_economic_impact_cybercrime_report.pdf 
(estimating that the annual losses are between a “conservative estimate” of $375 billion and 
a “maximum” of $575 billion, giving a “likely” estimate of “more than $400 billion”). 
Concentration of cyber attacks is as high or higher in the United States than any other 
country in the world. Id. at 8-9. One Lloyds study indicated that a single major global cyber-
attack could cause $3.5 billion in economic losses, roughly equivalent to 2012’s Superstorm 
Sandy. See TREVOR MAYNARD, COUNTING THE COST: CYBER EXPOSURE DECODED 5 (2017), 
https://www.lloyds.com/news-and-risk-insight/risk-reports/library/technology/countingthe 
cost. 
 20. Almost One-Third of U.S. Businesses Had a Data Breach, MUNICH RE (Dec. 7, 
2017), https://www.munichre.com/HSB/data-breach-survey-2017/index.html. 
 21. See Mihalic, supra note 5; Walter Andrews & Jennifer White, Real Estate Is Not 
Above the (Cyber Attack) Risk, COM. OBSERVER (Aug. 9, 2017, 3:58 PM), https:// 
commercialobserver.com/2017/08/real-estate-is-not-above-the-cyber-attack-risk/ (noting that 
at least one-third of real estate firms have experienced a cybersecurity event in the last two 
years). As one director from the Real Estate Financial Advisory practice at Deloitte 
summarizes: 
Industries like retail, travel and hospitality, and the financial services industries 
have long been dealing with cyberattacks, and have not only matured their 
response capability but also positioned cybersecurity as a core element of their 
businesses. In contrast, [CRE] . . . considers itself to be relatively less at risk 
from a potential cyberattack. This is because CRE firms typically maintain 
relatively less consumer personally identifiable information (PII) and valuable 
intellectual property (IP) directly on their own technology systems. However, 
due to the rise of smart buildings where tenants have building management 
systems on their smart phones, new opportunities for cyberattacks will emerge 
within the sector. The interconnectedness of real estate owners’ systems and 
tenant IT systems form a potential cyber risk for both parties. As a consequence 
to this heightened risk we predict IT and CRE will become more intertwined 
during the coming year to face these new cyber threats. 
Donkers, supra note 5. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019
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therefrom logically rested with them. Now, however, computers can be 
intertwined with the very shell or structure of the building itself,
22
 and while 
CRE owners frequently attempt to pass off all liability risks to others via 
triple-net leases, indemnity agreements, and other contractual remedies, the 
buck often stops with the landlord when it comes to insuring the shell of the 
building.
23
 This not only means that vast amounts of personal data may be 
incidentally or purposefully stored in CRE owners’ buildings, but also that 
critical, core components of the building itself are put at risk of system 
failure because a cyber event could disrupt the computers that operate them. 
Moreover, much like all other businesses, the corporate offices for CRE 
companies tend to hold “tax records, federal identification numbers, social 
security numbers and other [sensitive private] information” in their 
computer systems.
24
 Their corporate teams frequently (1) conduct complex 
                                                                                                                 
 22. See PRACTICAL LAW REAL ESTATE, CYBER SECURITY INSURANCE FOR COMMERCIAL 
REAL ESTATE (May 5, 2016), Westlaw W-002-1978 [hereinafter CYBER SECURITY 
INSURANCE FOR COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE]. Critical parts of modern building systems are 
remotely accessible through digital means, including closed-circuit TV; security systems; 
utilities; fire alarms; servers; voicemail; fax; and email. Id. In industrial real estate, 
expensive pieces of industrial hardware such as “switches, valves, pumps and other heavy 
machinery” are controlled by or with the assistance of computer technology. Cash, Doot & 
Blackburn, supra note 2.  
 23. See, e.g., PRACTICAL LAW REAL ESTATE, OFFICE LEASE AGREEMENT (MULTI-
TENANT NET LEASE) (PRO-LANDLORD SHORT FORM) (2018), Westlaw W-005-8336 
[hereinafter OFFICE LEASE AGREEMENT]. This particular Westlaw form office lease includes 
the following pertinent language:  
(d) Landlord shall purchase and maintain: (i) a standard policy of “all-risk” 
insurance with customary exclusions covering the Building in the full 
replacement cost of the Building, together with rent loss insurance and 
windstorm coverage (on a full replacement cost basis); and (ii) broad form 
commercial general liability insurance with a minimum combined single limit 
of liability of at least [NUMBER IN WORDS] Dollars ($[NUMBER]), written 
by companies authorized to do business in the State of [STATE]. 
Id.; see also STEPHEN RAPTIS & DONNA WILSON, BLOOMBERG BNA/MANATT WEBINAR, 
NAVIGATING THE EVOLVING WORLD OF CYBER INSURANCE (2016) (on file with author) 
(“Indemnity agreements typically have limitations, and are only as good as the entity 
providing the indemnity.”); Matthew R. Slakoff, Commercial Insurance Update—Managing 
Real Property Exposures, CAVIGNAC & ASSOCIATES (Aug. 2007), http://www.cavignac.com/ 
publications/publications-commercial-client-commercial-insurance-update/commercial-
insurance-update-managing-real-property-exposures/ (“In most cases, landlords should buy 
their own insurance covering the leased property.”). 
 24. John Mark Tichar, How Cyber Security Risks Impact the Real Estate Industry, 
OSWALD COMPANIES (Oct. 15, 2015), https://www.oswaldcompanies.com/blog-feed/how-
cyber-security-risks-impact-the-real-estate-industry/. These offices also often hold sensitive 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol71/iss2/3
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transactions by electronic means (e.g., completing closings through wire 
transfers), (2) utilize cloud servers, and (3) ask employees to use their own 
smartphones and tablets at work, all of which potentially expose massive 
amounts of personal and financial information to malicious actors.
25
 A CRE 
owner may purport to assign management of some of its data to a third 
party operator or property manager, but there still undeniably remains a 
massive amount of data that is in the care, custody, and control of the 
owner, whether it be connected to the underlying asset or on the corporate 
computers. Thus, it would be the owner’s insurance that would need to 
respond to cover any economic losses related to such data.
26
   
                                                                                                                 
corporate information in their systems, such as pending transactions for public-traded 
companies that have not yet been disclosed. 
 25. Donkers, supra note 5. The Deloitte Center for Financial Services has even 
predicted that commercial real estate may soon utilize blockchain technology for execution 
of “smart contracts.” SURABHI KEJRIWAL & SAURABH MAHAJAN, BLOCKCHAIN IN 
COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE 13 (2017), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/ 
us/Documents/financial-services/us-fsi-rec-blockchain-in-commercial-real-estate.pdf. 
 26. See, e.g., Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Policy No. 101017, Cyber Extortion Coverage 
Section (2013) [hereinafter Am. Int’l Grp., Cyber Extortion Coverage Section]; Am. Int’l. 
Grp., Inc., Policy No. 101018, Event Management Coverage Section (2013) [hereinafter 
Am. Int’l Grp., Event Management Coverage Section]; Am. Int’l. Grp., Inc., Policy No. 
101021, Network Interruption Coverage Section (2013) [hereinafter Am. Int’l Grp., Network 
Interruption Coverage Section]; Am. Int’l. Grp., Inc., Policy No. 101024, Security and 
Privacy Coverage Section (2013) [hereinafter Am. Int’l Grp., Security and Privacy Coverage 
Section]; Am. Int’l. Grp., Inc., Policy No. 115982, Reputation Guard Coverage Section 
(2013) [hereinafter Am. Int’l Grp., Reputation Guard Coverage Section] (defining 
“Computer System” as “any computer hardware, software or any components thereof that 
are . . . under the ownership, operation or control of, or that are leased by, a Company”); 
Jardine Lloyd Thompson, Asset Management Cyber Policy, Definitions 34, 39 (2017) 
[hereinafter JLT Asset Management Cyber Policy] (on file with the Oklahoma Law Review) 
(defining triggering “System Event” as an event affecting “the Company’s computer system” 
and “Privacy Breach Event” as breach of data “for which the Company is responsible”) 
(emphasis added); cf. Lauren G. Citrome, Data Centers and REITs: Is There Real Estate in 
the Cloud?, 11 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 191, 206 (2014) (stating that in the case of data REITs, 
where the underlying tenants’ actual line of business is data ownership, “tenants bring their 
own servers to store in rented cabinets at a data center”). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019
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B. Growth of Cyber Insurance
27
 
The earliest iterations of cyber insurance arrived on the market in the 
1990s under the auspices of errors and omissions coverage, generally 
covering computer virus or malware-related events,
28
 with the first cyber 
policy being underwritten in 1997 by AIG agent Steve Haase.
29
 These early 
policies afforded coverage only for third-party lawsuits arising from data 
breaches caused by outsiders of the insured company.
30
 The problem was 
that, in reality, over fifty percent of these breaches were coming from 
disgruntled employees inside the company.
31
 As the internet has grown, so 
too has the coverage.
32
 The market for stand-alone cyber policies has seen 
an explosion over the last decade because cyber risks have become so 
difficult to ignore both for businesses and their insurance carriers.
33
 In 
                                                                                                                 
 27. Cyber insurance has been marketed under various different names, including Cyber 
Liability Insurance, Network Security Insurance, Privacy Breach Insurance, Cyber Risk & 
Data Compromise Coverage, Cyber and Privacy Liability, Cyber & Security Incident, Cyber 
Cover Policy Program, and Cyber One. See Sasha Romanosky, Lillian Ablon, Andreas 
Kuehn & Therese Jones, Content Analysis of Cyber Insurance Policies: How do Carriers 
Price Cyber Risk? 9 (RAND Corp., Working Paper No. WR-1208, 2017) [hereinafter 
RAND Study], https://www.rand.org/pubs/working_papers/WR1208.html; RENE SIEMENS & 
DAVID L. BECK, SIEMENS AND BECK ON OBTAINING OPTIMAL CYBER INSURANCE *8 (Sept. 4, 
2012), 2012 Emerging Issues 6613 (Lexis) (on file with the Oklahoma Law Review). For 
simplicity’s sake, this Article will refer to all the above as “cyber insurance.” 
 28. Lauri Floresca, Cyber Insurance 101: The Basics of Cyber Coverage, WOODRUFF-
SAWYER (June 19, 2014)), https://woodruffsawyer.com/cyber-liability/cyber-basics/ (noting 
that in cyber insurance’s earliest days, the coverage was generally only purchased by 
technology companies). 
 29. See Brian D. Brown, The Ever-Evolving Nature of Cyber Coverage, INS. J. (Sept. 
24, 2014), https://www.insurancejournal.com/magazines/features/2014/09/22/340633.htm. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. See, e.g., ACE, Form No. PF-27000, Privacy Protection Privacy & Network 
Liability Insurance Policy (2009); Beazley, Form No. F00106, Information Security & 
Privacy Insurance with Electronic Media Liability Coverage (2011); Chubb Cyber 
Enterprise Risk Management Policy, Form No. PF-48169 (2016) (on file with the Oklahoma 
Law Review) [hereinafter Chubb Cyber Policy]; Evolve MGA, Evo 3.0: Our Evolved Cyber 
Policy (2015) [hereinafter Evolve MGA Cyber Policy]; JLT Asset Management Cyber 
Policy, supra note 26; Philadelphia Ins., Form No. PI-CYB-001, Cyber Security Liability 
Coverage (2012); Travelers, Form No. CYB-3001, CyberRisk (2010); Zurich, Form No. U-
SPR-1000-C CW, Security and Privacy Protection Policy (2014); see also Guidance 
Concerning Stand-Alone Cyber Liability insurance Policies Under the Terrorism Risk 
Insurance Program, 81 Fed. Reg. 95,312, 95,313 (Dec. 27, 2016). The U.S. Treasury 
Department noted: 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol71/iss2/3
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2016, insurers collected $3.25 billion in cyber premiums, up from $2.75 
billion in 2015 and $2.5 billion in 2014, with the market expected to triple 
by 2020 and quadruple by 2025.
34
 The relative novelty of cyber insurance 
presents both a challenge and an opportunity for risk managers and counsel 
because on the one hand, it is among the most negotiable (and thus the most 
malleable) types of coverage on the market, but on the other hand, it is 
among the most uncertain because of the dearth of court interpretations of 
cyber policy language and the lack of standardized forms.
35
  
                                                                                                                 
The cyber risk insurance market has evolved significantly since it first emerged 
approximately two decades ago and is expected to continue experiencing rapid 
growth. A 2016 report on cyber insurance noted that 19 different categories of 
coverage are available to a greater or lesser extent in the cyber insurance 
market, including first and third party coverage related to data breaches, cyber 
extortion, business interruption, data and software loss, physical damage, and 
death and bodily injury. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 34. STEPHEN O’HEARN ET AL., INSURANCE 2020 & BEYOND: REAPING THE DIVIDENDS OF 
CYBER RESILIENCE 10 (2015), http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/insurance/publications/assets/ 
reaping-dividends-cyber-resilience.pdf (“An estimated $2.5 billion in cyber insurance 
premium was written in 2014.”); see also Richard S. Betterley, Cyber/Privacy Insurance 
Market Survey: A Tough Market for Larger Insureds, but Smaller Insureds Finding Eager 
Insurers, BETTERLEY REP. June 2016, at 6 (“Large rates of growth seemed to be found in all 
sizes of insurers . . . .”); Raptis & Wilson, supra note 23. The number of companies that 
purchased cyber insurance “increased 250 percent between 2013 and 2015” alone. Stephen 
Joyce, Cybersecurity Insurance, Internet-of-Things Standards Linked, BLOOMBERG LAW: 
PRIVACY & DATA SECURITY (June 3, 2016), https://www.bna.com/cybersecurity-insurance-
internetofthings-n57982073576/.  
 35. See Micah E. Skidmore, Negotiating Coverage & Pursuing Claims Under Cyber-
Security & Privacy Insurance, 14 J. TEX. INS. L. 27, 28 (2015) (noting lack of court guidance 
on meanings of wrongful acts, “incidents,” “events,” and “breaches” in cyber policies); see 
also Raptis & Wilson, supra note 23. There have been only a few cases discussing the scope 
of cyber policies. See, e.g., P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc. v. Fed Ins. Co., No. CV-15-
01322-PHX-SMM, 2016 WL 3055111, at *8-9 (D. Ariz. May 31, 2016) (holding policy 
excluded coverage for fees required to be paid to credit card processor following breach); 
Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. v. Fed. Recovery Servs., Inc., 103 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1302 (D. Utah 
2015) (holding no errors and omissions coverage under cyber policy where third party 
complaint alleged knowledge, willfulness, and maliciousness); Columbia Cas. Co. v. 
Cottage Health Sys., 2:15–CV–03432, 2015 WL 4497730, at *1-2 (C.D. Cal. July 17, 2015) 
(wherein insurer argued that a “minimum required practices” exclusion and condition barred 
coverage, but no substantive ruling was made as it was dismissed to go to mediation per the 
policy language). The insurer’s complaint in Columbia Casualty is especially troubling, as it 
asserted it had no obligation to fund any of a $4.125 million class action settlement resulting 
from a group of hospitals’ data breach, solely due to the fact that the insured did not follow 
some “Minimum Required Practices” set forth in its application for the insurance. Compl. ¶¶ 
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C. Nature of Cyber Insurance 
An adequate cyber insurance policy covers both an insured’s first-party 
losses and third-party losses.
36
 First-party coverage may include payment 
for lost income resulting from the breach; administrative safeguards; 
recovery of lost data; hiring of experienced professionals for investigative 
and responsive purposes; notification to affected parties (by mail and 
through call centers, etc.); and credit monitoring for affected parties, if 
applicable.
37
 Third-party coverage includes payment for regulatory defense, 
fines, and punitive damages; costs of litigation defense; and litigation 
damages.
38
 The policies often have separate definitions for the “trigger 
events” of these coverages—e.g., under JLT Asset Management Cyber 
Policy wording, a “System Event” (with respect to the first-party costs) as 
opposed to a “Privacy Breach Event” (with respect to the third-party 
costs).
39
 Under the JLT policy, “System Event” is defined as:  
any intrusion, modification, damage inability to access, service 
degradation, corruption, or failure of the Company’s Computer 
System due to:  
 (i) a denial of service attack, a malicious code, computer 
virus, or hacker attack 
 (ii) any negligence, or mistakes, in operating, maintaining or 
upgrading the Company’s Computer System 
 (iii) Programming errors or software bugs in fully operational 
and integrated programs or software 





                                                                                                                 
4, 8, 26-27, Columbia Casualty v. Cottage Health Systems, 2:15–cv–03432, 2015 WL 
4497730 (C.D. Cal. July 17, 2015). 
 36. See RAND Study, supra note 27, at 11-12; CYBER SECURITY INSURANCE FOR 
COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE, supra note 22; see also Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Form No. BP 15 
07 03 15, Information Security Protection Endorsement (2014) [hereinafter Ins. Servs. 
Office, Information Security Protection Endorsement Form]. 
 37. See generally RAND Study, supra note 27; see also CYBER SECURITY INSURANCE 
FOR COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE, supra note 22; Ins. Servs. Office, Information Security 
Protection Endorsement Form, supra note 36. 
 38. See sources cited supra note 37. 
 39. See JLT Asset Management Cyber Policy, supra note 26, Definitions 34 and 39.  
 40. See id. at Definition 39. 
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“Privacy Breach Event” is then defined as:  
the actual or alleged unauthorised disclosure, access, or 
transmission of: 
 (i) personally identifiable information (PII), including an 
individual’s name, address, telephone number, health 
information, or credit card, debit card, and bank account 
information 
 (ii) any Third Party’s trade secrets, data, designs, forecasts, 
formulas, practices, processes, records, reports, documents 
subject to legal privilege or other item of information that is not 




The JLT policy also covers “Cyber Extortion” (i.e., ransomware, 
discussed below) and “Digital Media Liability” (liability from alleged torts 
committed during the course of the insured’s website or social media 
operations) under still more separate definitions.
42
 
These distinct definitions can be critical. To take just one example, cyber 
policies typically assign “waiting periods” whereby the insurer will only 
provide coverage for any business interruption losses that occur after a 
certain number of hours, and the moment when that waiting period begins 
                                                                                                                 
 41. See JLT Asset Management Cyber Policy, supra note 26, Definition 34; see also 
Am. Int’l Grp., Security and Privacy Coverage Section, supra note 26, Definition 2(l). The 
AIG policy defines “Privacy Event” as follows: 
 (1) any failure to protect Confidential Information (whether by "phishing," 
other social engineering technique or otherwise) including, without limitation, 
that which could result in an identity theft or other wrongful emulation of the 
identity of an individual or corporation; 
 (2) any failure to disclose an event referenced in Sub-paragraph (1) above in 
violation of any Security Breach Notice Law; 
 (3) any unintentional failure of an Insured to comply with those parts of a 
Company's privacy policy that (a) prohibit or restrict the disclosure or sale of 
Confidential Information by an Insured, or (b) require an Insured to allow an 
individual to access or correct Confidential Information about such individual; 
or 
 (4) any violation of a federal, state, foreign or local privacy statute alleged 
in connection with a Claim for a failure described in Sub-paragraphs (1) or (2) 
above. 
Id. 
 42. JLT Asset Management Cyber Policy, supra note 26, Additional Coverage Sections 
C(1)-(2); see also Am. Int’l Grp., Cyber Extortion Coverage Section, supra note 26. 
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is determined by which “event” starts the clock.
43
 In the JLT example, the 
triggering event is a “System Event,” and thus the insured need only self-
insure losses for ten hours after “any intrusion,” which presumably would 
mean the moment a phishing e-mail is sent, even if it is not opened until 
hours or even days later.
44
 If the triggering event were a “Privacy Breach 
Event,” however, the waiting period clock would start when “the actual or 
alleged unauthorised disclosure, access, or transmission” occurs, which 
could mean that the insurer might cover significantly less in the first party 
context, because many of the costs associated with a data breach arise 
almost simultaneously with the disclosure, access, or transmission.
45
 The 
JLT definition offers a favorable outcome in terms of counting up losses 
relative to the waiting period, but not so favorable in that only a “System 
Event” will actually trigger business interruption coverage, whereas Privacy 
Breach Events and Cyber Extortion events will not.
46
 
D. Negotiability of Cyber Insurance 
Unlike traditional lines of insurance, cyber insurance is difficult to price 
because it is difficult for carriers to quantify the risks involved.
47
 
Underwriters can predict, for example, by operating on some reasonable 
factual assumptions, which counties are more likely to suffer damage from 
a hurricane, but the scope and scale of the danger of cyber events is more 
difficult to pin down.
48
 Some data supports the assertion that hackers target 
                                                                                                                 
 43. See JLT Asset Management Cyber Policy, supra note 26, Business Interruption and 
System Restoration A(1); Evolve MGA Cyber Policy, supra note 33, Insuring Clause 3, 
Section B; Am. Int’l Grp., Network Interruption Coverage Section, supra note 26, Section 1 
(Insuring Agreement). 
 44. See JLT Asset Management Cyber Policy, supra note 26, Definition 39. 
 45. See id. at Definition 34; see also infra Section IV.A-B. 
 46. See sources cited supra note 43; see also infra Section III.B, Part VI. 
 47. PricewaterhouseCoopers, supra note 34, at 9. Underwriters struggle with the lack of 
historical data as well as the constantly changing nature of cyberattacks when pricing cyber 
insurance. Id.; see also RAND Study, supra note 27, at 23 (“In only a few cases were 
carriers confident in their own experience to develop pricing models.”). In response to this 
issue, insurers are lobbying government regulators to allow them access, at least on an 
anonymized basis, to any cyber-related data collected in enforcement actions. See William 
Shaw, GDPR's Reporting Mandate May Fuel Fledgling Cyber Market, LAW360 (Mar. 7, 
2018, 9:58 PM GMT), https://www.law360.com/articles/1019400/gdpr-s-reporting-mandate-
may-fuel-fledgling-cyber-market. 
 48. See Shaw, supra note 47. As Russ Johnston, CEO of QBE North America, 
summarized: “Most major cat exposures tend to have a season. To the extent you have 
sophisticated models, the market can expect events and project magnitudes. Cyber does not 
have a season and can cross multiple lines of business and customer segments.” Rebecca 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol71/iss2/3
2019]       INSURANCE OF CYBER RISKS FOR REAL ESTATE 409 
 
 
smaller businesses because of their weaker cybersecurity measures,
49
 but 
other data suggests that it is larger companies that suffer much greater 
losses.
50
 Hackers may show no rhyme or reason as to which companies they 
target. The ransom amount cyber attackers request in a ransomware attack 
varies; the business interruption losses are unpredictable because one does 
not know how long systems will remain shut down, and the response by 
governmental authorities like the FBI is often inadequate as the hacker(s) 
frequently escape scot-free.
51
 All of these variables, on the one hand, make 
pricing of cyber insurance challenging, but on the other hand, they make it 
heavily negotiable. The market price can fluctuate massively depending on 
the robustness of the insured’s cybersecurity practices, the insured’s line of 
business, the amount of and types of coverages purchased, the amount of 




                                                                                                                 
Bole, Silent Cyber - The New Catastrophe Risk: CIAB Round-up, ADVISEN FRONT PAGE 
NEWS (Oct. 12, 2017), http://www.advisen.com/tools/fpnproc/fpns/articles_new_1/P/ 
294251097.html?rid=294251097&list_id=1. 
 49. A total of 58% of data-breach victims in a 2018 Verizon study were categorized as 
“small businesses.” VERIZON, 2018 DATA BREACH INVESTIGATIONS REPORT 5 (11th ed.), 
https://www.verizonenterprise.com/resources/reports/rp_DBIR_2018_Report_en_xg.pdf; see 
also Geoffrey A. Fowler & Ben Worthen, Hackers Shift Attacks to Small Firms, WALL ST. J. 
(July 21, 2011), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527023045676045764541737 
06460768?ns=prod/accounts-wsj. 
 50. PricewaterhouseCoopers, supra note 34, at 8. 
 51. See Mihalic, supra note 5. For example, the perpetrators of the ransomware attack 
on Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center were never found. Id. The email “spoofing” 
scam artists who tricked a company employee into wiring $4.8 million to a Chinese bank 
account in the underlying facts of Medidata Solutions Inc. v. Federal Insurance Co. were 
never found or even identified. See Jeff Sistrunk, Email Scam Not a Covered Fraud, Insurer 
Org. Tells 2nd Circ., LAW360 (Nov. 29, 2017, 9:49 PM EST), https://www. 
law360.com/articles/989344/email-scam-not-a-covered-fraud-insurer-org-tells-2nd-circ-; see 
also discussion infra Section V.C. The U.S. federal government itself suffers from 
cyberattacks on a regular basis and thus surely cannot be counted upon to prevent or remedy 
cyberattacks on private companies or citizens. See Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Hacking of 
Government Computers Exposed 21.5 Million People, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/10/us/office-of-personnel-management-hackers-got-data-
of-millions.html (reporting on massive hacking of government computer systems leading to 
compromise of SSNs and other sensitive information); Michelle Price, U.S. SEC Says 
Hackers May Have Traded Using Stolen Insider Information, REUTERS (Sept. 21, 2017, 6:26 
AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/legal-us-sec-intrusion/u-s-sec-says-hackers-may-have-
traded-using-stolen-insider-information-idUSKCN1BW1K0 (discussing hacking of SEC’s 
“EDGAR” database and subsequent insider trading resulting therefrom). 
 52. See Siemens & Beck, supra note 27, at *10; Raptis & Wilson, supra note 23; L.D. 
Simmons II, A Buyer’s Guide to Cyber Insurance, MCGUIREWOODS LLP (Oct. 2, 2013), 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019
410 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:397 
 
 
III. First Party Cyber Risks 
CRE stakeholders need to ensure that they have proper coverage for 
direct loss of assets resulting from a cyber event. This part of the Article 
discusses three of the most significant “first-party” concerns in the cyber 
arena from a CRE perspective and how typical cyber insurance policies 
respond: (1) loss of tangible property, money, or important data from 
system failures or cyberattacks; (2) business interruption from data 
breaches or cyberattacks; and (3) money paid out due to ransomware 
attacks. 
A. Loss of Tangible Property, Money, or Important Data 
Cyber attacks and system failures at smart buildings could lead to 
significant physical damage because the computer systems involved are 
interconnected with the utilities and basic functions of the buildings.
53
 They 
also can lead to the loss of or damage to important electronic data that is 
critical to the smooth operation of the company.
54
 This might include 
valuable customer account information, employee information, trade secrets 
or other intellectual property, or confidential internal correspondence, any 
of which might be stolen in a data breach.
55
 Additionally, malicious actors 
may seek to obtain money from the company by re-routing wire transfers or 
by conducting so-called “spoofing” schemes, or “social engineering,” 
where they pretend to be a person entitled to payment of funds via a 
convincing email, and a company employee obliges them by wiring funds 
to the account instructed. To the extent possible, CRE insureds should 
ensure that they have first-party coverage for property, dollars, and data that 
could be lost in a cyber event, including money paid out to scams, 
investigation of the hacking incidents, incident response, notification and 
credit monitoring of affected parties, and data and software restoration. 
Unfortunately, most cyber policies will not cover physical damage to 
property or equipment resulting from a cyber event, which is one of the 
                                                                                                                 
https://www.mcguirewoods.com/Client-Resources/Alerts/2013/10/Buyers-Guide-to-Cyber-
Insurance.aspx. Factors that can drive up the cost of coverage include whether the insured is 
involved in the healthcare or retail industries and whether the insured has a history of data 
breaches. Raptis & Wilson, supra note 23; see also RAND Study, supra note 27, at 23 (“[I]t 
was not unseen for carriers to examine their competitors in order to define rates.”). 
 53. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 54. See id. 
 55. See O’Brien & Kejriwal, supra note 5. 
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most significant risks a smart building owner faces.
56
 Many policies will 
also carve out or exclude coverage for lost value of intellectual property, 
which eliminates even more of the policies’ alleged value.
57
 Additionally, 
as discussed in Part V, courts continue to wrestle with the issue of whether 
commercial crime insurance already covers email scammers who engage in 
“spoofing” or “social engineering” schemes.
58
 Often the only novel 
coverage the cyber policy does provide on the first party side is the costs 
associated with lost electronic data and software restoration, e.g., 
“repairing, restoring, re-collecting or reconstructing any data or software 
applications hosted on the Company’s Computer System.”
59
 Such costs are 
likely to be relatively insignificant when compared to the potential damage 
to physical and intellectual property, as well as loss of money, that may 
inflict CRE insureds. The CRE owner might be left wondering whether 
cyber coverage is worth purchasing at all.
60
 
                                                                                                                 
 56. See RAND Study, supra note 27, at 14-15; Evolve MGA Cyber Policy, supra note 
33, Exclusion 21 (excluding any payment “for any tangible property repair or replacement 
including the cost of repairing any hardware or replacing any tangible property or 
equipment”); id. at Exclusion 5; JLT Asset Management Cyber Policy, supra note 26, 
Exclusions 8, 14 (excluding “(i) any loss or destruction of tangible property other than Data” 
and “(ii) any repair or replacement of hardware or equipment which forms part of the 
Company’s Computer System”); Raptis & Wilson, supra note 23; Chubb Cyber Policy, 
supra note 33, Exclusion 6, (excluding, under property damage definition, losses related to 
“physical injury to, or loss or destruction of, tangible property, including the loss of use 
thereof whether or not it is damaged or destroyed”). The property damage exclusion should 
at least be negotiated to carve out damage to intangible property, i.e., electronic data, one of 
the very reasons the cyber policy is meant to exist in the first place. See, e.g., JLT Asset 
Management Cyber Policy, supra note 26, Exclusion 14(i) (excluding, inter alia,
“any loss or destruction of tangible property, other than Data”). 
 57. See Shawn Tuma & Katti Smith, Risky Business: Why Lawyers Need to Understand 
Cyber Insurance for Their Clients, 78 TEX. B.J. 854, 855 (2015); RAND Study, supra note 
27, at 14-15; JLT Asset Management Cyber Policy, supra note 26, Exclusion 9; Chubb 
Cyber Policy, supra note 33, Exclusion 13. Given the amount of unique technology systems 
that can be in place in smart buildings due to the innovative designs by the engineers and IT 
professionals, this could be a significant issue. This gap in coverage is especially critical for 
engineers and architects who design smart buildings, as their intellectual property relating to 
this new technology is becoming increasingly valuable. See Mihalic, supra note 5. Similarly, 
and as a side note, CRE should ensure that any contracting architects and engineers carry 
errors and omissions coverage separately from cyber coverage to ensure that any defective 
designs in the smart buildings are insured. 
 58. See Spoofing, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/spoofing.asp 
(last visited Oct. 16, 2018); see also infra Section V.C. 
 59. See JLT Asset Management Cyber Policy, supra note 26, Business Interruption and 
System Restoration A(3). 
 60. But see infra Section V.A (casting doubt on this notion). 
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B. Business Interruption  
Business interruption is “a time-element coverage offered under first-
party property policies” that covers the costs associated with a necessitated 
shutdown of business operations on the premises caused by a direct 
physical loss or specified cause of loss under the policy.
61
 CRE 
policyholders should be concerned about business interruption costs 
accompanying cyber events, including the lost rent and other revenue that 
might stem from a system failure, as well as the potential loss of customers, 
investors, tenants, reputation, and goodwill resulting from a data breach and 
resulting public concern. For example, in the smart building context, if a 
hacker breaks into a building’s electricity system (which is operated by a 
centralized computer) and turns it off for a month, the building owner might 
have trouble collecting rent from its tenants because of disruptions in their 
respective businesses.
62
 Furthermore, if highly publicized data breaches 
affecting commercial tenants at the property lead to a drop in business,
63
 it 
is conceivable that those tenants will become insolvent or otherwise 
incapable of continuing to pay rent. 
Cyber insurance may cover the lost rental income and extra expenses 
associated with a cyber event.
64
 This coverage should include reputational 
harm and loss of future revenue (although how one can calculate such a 
number is another intriguing question altogether).
65
 Most policies will 
predicate business interruption coverage on there being a “System Event” 
                                                                                                                 
 61. Costantino P. Suriano & Bruce R. Kaliner, Business Interruption Meets Cyber 
Coverage, BUS. INS. (Mar. 6, 2017, 12:00 AM), http://www.businessinsurance.com/ 
article/00010101/ISSUE0401/912312222/Business-interruption-meets-cyber-risk-coverage. 
 62. See, e.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 227 (McKinney, Westlaw through 2018 Legis. 
Sess.) (New York’s constructive eviction statute). The law states: 
Where any building, which is leased or occupied, is destroyed or so injured by 
the elements, or any other cause as to be untenantable, and unfit for occupancy, 
and no express agreement to the contrary has been made in writing, the lessee 
or occupant may, if the destruction or injury occurred without his or her fault or 
neglect, quit and surrender possession of the leasehold premises, and of the 
land so leased or occupied; and he or she is not liable to pay to the lessor or 
owner, rent for the time subsequent to the surrender. Any rent paid in advance 
or which may have accrued by the terms of a lease or any other hiring shall be 
adjusted to the date of such surrender. 
Id. This law is applicable to commercial leases. See generally Barash v. Pa. Terminal Real 
Estate Corp., 256 N.E.2d 707 (N.Y. 1970); Johnson v. Cabrera, 668 N.Y.S.2d 45 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1998). 
 63. See generally Suriano & Kaliner, supra note 61. 
 64. See id.; see also sources cited supra note 43. 
 65. Tuma & Smith, supra note 57, 855; Raptis & Wilson, supra note 23. 
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rather than a “Privacy Breach Event,” which can be a problem in and of 
itself.
66
 For example, if a hacker intrudes upon a building’s computer 
systems in order to gather massive amounts of personally identifiable 
information (PII) to sell, but does not deny any critical building services, 
then businesses may not actually cease operations.
67
 Still, when the PII is 
ultimately released or sold, bad publicity could cause the tenants’ revenues 
to suffer over time, which could ultimately lead to lost rental income to the 
landlord/owner.
68
 Policies that do not cover this risk ought to be avoided 
because this indirect loss in revenue is a significant concern for CRE 
owners whose financial salubriousness originates in no small part from that 
of their tenants.
69
 Thus it is critical that CRE insureds carefully read the 
business interruption language in all cyber policies available to them, as the 
decision on which policy to buy could come down to which language offers 
the broadest type of coverage and is most easily triggered. 
C. Ransomware Attacks 
Cyber events do not always happen in isolation—they may come with 
ransom messages, demanding payment of Bitcoin or payment by electronic 
wire transfer to an attacker’s bank account in exchange for a return to 
normalcy in computer systems or for neglecting to sell or reveal 
individuals’ PII on the dark web.
70
 These are generally referred to as 
                                                                                                                 
 66. See sources cited supra note 43. 
 67. Suriano & Kaliner, supra note 61. 
 68. See id. 
 69. Siemens & Beck, supra note 27, at *3.  
 70. See Greg Bensinger & Robert McMillan, Uber Reveals Data Breach and Cover-up, 
Leading to Two Firings, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 21, 2017, 11:38 PM ET), https://www. 
wsj.com/articles/uber-reveals-data-breach-and-cover-up-leading-to-two-firings-1511305453; 
Dan Bilefsky, Hackers Use New Tactic at Austrian Hotel: Locking the Doors, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/30/world/europe/hotel-austria-bitcoin-
ransom.html; Robert Hutton, Jeremy Kahn & Jordan Robertson, Extortionists Mount Global 
Hacking Attack Seeking Ransom, BLOOMBERG (last updated May 13, 2017, 3:52 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-05-12/patients-turned-away-as-british-
hospitals-hit-by-cyber-attack; Mihalic, supra note 5; Giles Turner, Anurag Kotoky & 
Christian Wienberg, Ransomware Cyberattack Goes Global, BLOOMBERG (June 28, 2017, 
11:28 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-06-28/cyberattack-reaches-
asia-as-new-targets-hit-by-ransomware-demand; see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HOW TO 
PROTECT YOUR NETWORKS FROM RANSOMWARE 2 (2016), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-
ccips/file/872771/download. (noting that since January 1, 2016, homes and businesses have 
suffered more than 4,000 ransomware attacks per day, a 300% increase since 2015, making 
ransomware the fastest growing malware threat in existence).  
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 or “Cyber Extortion”
72
 events. One disturbing example of a 
ransomware event in the real estate world occurred in February of 2016 at 
Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center, where hackers turned off all 
hospital computer systems, including emergency systems, thereby inducing 
a panic and eventually a ransom payment by the hospital of $17,000 worth 
of Bitcoin.
73
 To curb the possible pitfalls of events like this, CRE insureds 
need first-party coverage not only for the property damage, data restoration, 
and business interruption costs associated with cyber events, but also for the 
dollars actually paid out to cyber criminals. This is one area where most 
cyber policies should theoretically provide coverage.
74
 
                                                                                                                 
 71. The FBI defines “ransomware” as follows in their Internet Crime Complaint Center 
report: 
a form of malware targeting both human and technical weaknesses in an effort 
to deny the availability of critical data and/or systems. Ransomware is 
frequently delivered through various vectors, including phishing and Remote 
Desktop Protocol (RDP). RDP allows computers to connect to each other 
across a network. In one scenario, spear phishing emails are sent to end users 
resulting in the rapid encryption of sensitive files on a corporate network. 
When the victim organization determines they are no longer able to access their 
data, the cyber actor demands the payment of a ransom, typically in virtual 
currency such as Bitcoin. The actor will purportedly provide an avenue to the 
victim to regain access to their data. Recent iterations target specific 
organizations and their employees, making awareness and training a critical 
preventative measure. In 2016, the IC3 received 2,673 complaints identified as 
ransomware with losses of over $2.4 million. 
FBI, 2016 INTERNET CRIME REPORT 10, https://pdf.ic3.gov/2016_IC3Report.pdf. 
 72. The FBI discusses “extortion” separately in the same Internet Crime Complaint 
Center report: 
 Extortion is defined as an incident when a cyber criminal demands 
something of value from a victim by threatening physical or financial harm or 
the release of sensitive data. Extortion is often used in various schemes 
reported to the IC3, including Denial of Service attacks, hitman schemes, 
sextortion, Government impersonation schemes, loan schemes, and high-profile 
data breaches. Another tactic exploited in extortion schemes is the use of 
virtual currency as a payment mechanism. Virtual currency provides the cyber 
criminal an additional layer of anonymity when perpetrating these schemes. 
The IC3 continues to receive complaints regarding various extortion 
techniques. In 2016, the IC3 received 17,146 extortion-related complaints with 
adjusted losses of over $15 million. 
Id. at 13; see also JLT Asset Management Cyber Policy, supra note 26, Additional Coverage 
Section C(2). 
 73. See Mihalic, supra note 5. 
 74. See supra Section II.C (discussing cyber policy’s coverage of “cyber extortion”). 
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To add a further layer of complexity, however, several high-profile 
ransomware attacks have come from rogue foreign governments.
75
 Look no 
further than the infamous WannaCry ransomware that affected over 
200,000 victims in 150 countries, which is widely attributed to the North 
Korean government.
76
 The sponsorship of such a rogue foreign actor, in and 
of itself, may create a gap in coverage because cyber liability policies often 
exclude not only war (an insurance policy staple), but also broader perils 
like “act[s] of foreign enemy, hostilities or warlike activities.”
77
 Such 
language could preclude coverage for events like North Korea’s sponsored 
cyberattack on Sony.
78
 Even if the insured successfully convinces the 
carrier that North Korea is not a “foreign enemy” or engaging in 
“hostilities” (a dubious premise), cyberwarfare could certainly be construed 
to be a “warlike activity.” Such language may provide the insurer a 
convenient excuse to deny coverage.  
This reasoning for denial may be further bolstered by the commonly 
incorporated “Terrorism” exclusion, defined as including “the use of force 
or violence . . . whether acting alone, on behalf of or in connection with any 
                                                                                                                 
 75. See, e.g., Ryan Browne, UK Government: North Korea Was Behind the WannaCry 
Cyber-Attack that Crippled Health Service, CNBC (Oct. 27, 2017, 11:56 AM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/10/27/uk-north-korea-behind-wannacry-cyber-attack-that-
crippled-nhs.html (noting Great Britain’s hypothesis that North Korea was the origin of 
infamous WannaCry ransomware attack against U.K. National Health Service); Riley & 
Robertson, supra note 18 (reporting Russian attempts at meddling in U.S. elections); Sanger 
& Perlroth, supra note 17 (discussing North Korea attack on Sony); see also Dustin Volz, 
U.S. Charges, Sanctions Iranians for Global Cyber Attacks on Behalf of Tehran, REUTERS 
(Mar. 23, 2018, 9:09 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-cyber-iran/u-s-charges-
sanctions-iranians-for-global-cyber-attacks-on-behalf-of-tehran-idUSKBN1GZ22K. 
 76. Cyber Attack Hits 200,000 in at Least 150 Countries: Europol, REUTERS (May 14, 
2017, 5:23 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cyber-attack-europol/cyber-attack-hits-
200000-in-at-least-150-countries-europol-idUSKCN18A0FX; see also Dustin Volz, U.S. 
Blames North Korea for 'WannaCry' Cyber Attack, REUTERS (Dec. 18, 2017), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-cyber-northkorea/u-s-blames-north-korea-for-
wannacry-cyber-attack-idUSKBN1ED00Q. 
 77. JLT Asset Management Cyber Policy, supra note 26, Exclusion 23; see also Evolve 
MGA Cyber Policy, supra note 33, Exclusion 28(a) (excluding losses arising directly or 
indirectly out of “war, invasion, acts of foreign enemies, hostilities or warlike operations 
(whether war is declared or not)”); Maynard, supra note 19, at 17; RAND Study, supra note 
27, at 15 (noting “expenses for extortion or from an act of terrorism, war, or a military action 
[are] covered in rare cases, but mostly noted as exclusions” in cyber policies); Raptis & 
Wilson, supra note 23 (noting prevalence of these exclusions and thus absence of coverage 
for incidents similar to North Korea’s hacking of Sony).  
 78. See Cyber Attack Hits 200,000 in at Least 150 Countries: Europol, supra note 76; 
see also Volz, supra note 76.  
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organization(s), committed for political, religious, ideological purposes.”
79
 
The Terrorism exclusion paints with a fairly broad brush, and could also be 
argued to exclude ransomware attacks. Although ransomware attacks are 
not typically violent, there is always some effort to “force” payment of 
currency, and the insurance carrier could always argue that any living and 
breathing person has some kind of “ideological purpose.” Insurers could 
attempt to use both the War and the Terrorism exclusions, if they are 
worded broadly enough, to deny ransomware or “Cyber Extortion” 
coverage under certain circumstances.  
IV. Third Party Cyber Risks 
CRE stakeholders also need to carry adequate insurance coverage that 
obliges the insurer to defend against claims arising out of a data breach 
(whether an accidental breach by the insured or one by a hacker). This part 
discusses the different sorts of “third-party” concerns in the cyber arena 
from a CRE perspective and how typical cyber policies respond, namely: 
(1) contract and tort liability, (2) government enforcement actions, and (3) 
derivative/shareholder litigation. 
A. Contract and Tort Liability 
Cyber events can result in costly litigation in the form of class action 
lawsuits.
80
 Although it may be dubious whether the plaintiffs have suffered 
an injury-in-fact in data breach cases, courts remain divided on whether 
                                                                                                                 
 79. JLT Asset Management Cyber Policy, supra note 26, Exclusion 21; see also Evolve 
MGA Cyber Policy, supra note 33, Exclusion 28(b) (excluding “any act or threat of force or 
violence . . . , whether acting alone or on behalf of or in connection with any organization or 
government, committed for political, religious, ideological or similar purposes”); RAND 
Study, supra note 27, at 15 (noting “expenses for extortion or from an act of terrorism, war, 
or a military action [are] covered in rare cases, but mostly noted as exclusions” in cyber 
policies); Raptis & Wilson, supra note 23. 
 80. See, e.g., Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 691-92 (7th Cir. 
2015) (analyzing dispute where customers brought a putative class action against Neiman 
Marcus after cyber attackers stole their credit card information, and the customers asserted 
negligence, breach of implied contract, unjust enrichment, unfair and deceptive business 
practices, invasion of privacy, and the violation of state data breach laws); Edvard 
Pettersson, Uber Sued for Negligence After Disclosing Massive Data Breach, BLOOMBERG 
(Nov. 21, 2017, 7:46 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-11-22/uber-
sued-for-negligence-after-disclosing-massive-data-breach (discussing a class action lawsuit 
arising out of an Uber data breach affecting 50 million Uber riders and 7 million drivers 
(citing Class Action Complaint, Flores v. Raiser, LLC, 2:17-CV-08 503 (C.D. Cal Nov. 21, 
2017))).  
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such plaintiffs have standing to sue depending on the facts and 
circumstances.
81
 A release of PII can give rise to privacy-related litigation 
under a variety of legal theories such as invasion of privacy,
82
 breach of 
contract,
83
 plain vanilla negligence,
84
 and liability under state privacy 
statutes.
85
 These lawsuits pose a far greater danger to CRE in the age of 
smart buildings. The owner of the building may no longer be able to hide 
behind its contractual risk transfers to tenants because private data is being 
stored and transferred either in the shell of the building itself or on a 
network system indistinguishably connected to the owner.
86
 Similarly, even 
                                                                                                                 
 81. See, e.g., Remijas, 794 F.3d at 691-92 (analyzing customers’ putative class action 
claims against Neiman Marcus following a cyber-attack in which the attackers obtained the 
plaintiffs’ credit card information). The Seventh Circuit in this case reversed and remanded 
an Illinois district court ruling that the plaintiffs lacked standing, finding that “injuries 
associated with resolving fraudulent charges and protecting oneself against future identity 
theft” were sufficient to constitute injuries in fact for Article III standing purposes. Id. at 
696-97. This reversal ultimately led to a $1.6 million settlement in favor of the plaintiffs in 
2017 after years of litigation. Suevon Lee, Neiman Marcus to Pay $1.6M in Shopper Data 
Breach Suit, LAW360 (Mar. 17, 2017, 10:15 PM EDT), https://www.law360.com/ 
articles/903573/neiman-marcus-to-pay-1-6m-in-shopper-data-breach-suit; see also In re 
Target Corp. Data Sec. Breach Litigation, 66 F. Supp. 3d 1154 (D. Minn. 2014); Corona v. 
Sony Pictures Entm’t, Inc., No. 14–CV–09600 RGK (Ex), 2015 WL 3916744 (C.D. Cal. 
2015) (plaintiffs survived motions to dismiss for lack of standing); Galaria v. Nationwide 
Mut. Ins. Co., 663 F. App’x 384 (6th Cir. 2016) (reversing and remanding an Ohio state 
court decision finding that plaintiffs’ increased risk of harm following a data breach at 
Nationwide and plaintiffs’ expenses to guard against such risks were insufficient to establish 
injuries in fact for standing purposes); Flores, LLC, 2:17-CV-08503; Ruiz v. Gap, Inc., 540 
F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1126 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (holding plaintiff had standing to sue based on an 
alleged increased risk of identity theft). But see Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 
1138 (2013) (holding plaintiffs lacked standing to sue National Security Administration 
because they did not show the threat of interception of their personal communications to be 
“certainly impending to constitute injury in fact”); Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 274-76 
(4th Cir. 2017) (holding precise opposite of Galaria court); Santana v. Take-Two Interactive 
Software, Inc., 717 F. App’x 12, 17-18 (2d Cir. 2017) (affirming the Southern District of 
New York’s dismissal of Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act class action for lack of 
standing). 
 82. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (Am. Law Inst. 1977) 
(discussing intrusion upon seclusion as invasion of privacy); id. § 652D (discussing publicity 
given to private life as invasion of privacy). 
 83. See Remijas, 794 F.3d at 690. 
 84. See id. 
 85. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 995.50 (2014). 
 86. See supra Section II.A; see also Mike Weston, “Smart Cities” Will Know 
Everything About You, WALL ST. J. (July 12, 2015, 6:36 PM ET), http://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/smart-cities-will-know-everything-about-you-1436740596. Journalist Mike Weston 
ominously prophesizes:  
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where the plaintiffs place blame solely on the tenants, those same tenants 
could then turn around and look to the owner for indemnification for any 




While privacy tort liability defense is usually included in the limits of a 
market-competitive cyber policy, contractual liability arising out of data 
breaches generally is not.
88
 For example, the definition of “damages” in the 
sample JLT policy discussed in this Article excludes “costs or other 
amounts that the Insured is responsible for under a merchant services 
agreement, unless they are liable for such amounts in the absence of such 
agreement.”
89
 This definition would arguably include payments to credit 
card companies for failure to comply with terms of the credit card services 
agreement,
90
 which can be one of the most significant costs arising out of a 
                                                                                                                 
In a fully “smart” city, every movement an individual makes can be tracked. 
The data will reveal where she works, how she commutes, her shopping habits, 
places she visits and her proximity to other people. . . . [T]his data will be 
centralized and easy to access. . . .Private companies could know more about 
people than they know about themselves. 
Id. This increased interconnectedness exponentially increases the liability exposure for CRE. 
 87. See generally O’Brien & Kejriwal, supra note 5. 
 88. See P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., No. CV-15-01322-PHX-
SMM, 2016 WL 3055111 at *7-8 (D. Ariz. May 31, 2016) (CyberSecurity by Chubb Policy 
did not cover restaurant for its indemnity obligations to Bank of America resulting from fees 
imposed on Bank of America by credit card associations due to stolen customer credit card 
information); JLT Asset Management Cyber Policy, supra note 26, Exclusion 4, Definition 
11; RAND Study, supra note 27, at 15. As one underwriter noted: 
Many policy forms in the marketplace directly exclude contractual indemnities 
and liability, including that which stems from merchant service agreements. 
Some policy forms initially grant coverage for breach of contract claims, but 
then add exclusions concerning key components of this coverage. In addition, 
some policy forms exclude breach of contract claims with some very narrow 
carvebacks to the exclusionary wording that may not help the insured much in 
the event of a payment card breach. Although most privacy/security insurance 
policies grant the insured coverage for situations in which they need to incur 
the first-party costs to notify individuals and extend insureds credit monitoring 
services, not all will directly respond to the breach of, or the indemnities 
contained in, a merchant services agreement. 
Matt Donovan, Banking on Credit: Merchants Bear the Brunt of Data Breach Risks in the 
Hospitality Industry, PROPERTYCASUALTY 360º (Nov. 30, 2013), http://www.property 
casualty360.com/2013/11/30/banking-on-credit. 
 89. JLT Asset Management Cyber Policy, supra note 26, Definition 11. 
 90. See, e.g., P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., No. CV-15-01322-PHX-
SMM, 2016 WL 3055111, at *2 (D. Ariz. May 31, 2016). In P.F. Chang’s, the Chinese 
restaurant had to pay Bank of America Merchant Services (BAMS) “any fines, fees, or 
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data breach. Additionally, some cyber policies have exclusions or 
restrictions on payments for liability arising out of consumer protection 
statutes, which are a substantial source of privacy-related litigation across 
the United States.
91
 Accordingly, cyber policies may be helpful for 
responding to some civil lawsuits, but they generally leave much to be 
desired in the breadth of such coverage. 
B. Government Enforcement Actions 
Beyond pure traditional contract and tort liability, privacy liability has 
also increasingly taken the form of government enforcement actions. All 
fifty states, along with the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, and 
the U.S. Virgin Islands, have enacted data breach notification laws 
requiring private entities to notify individuals of data breaches involving 
certain PII within a specified period of time.
92
 Some of these statutes allow 
                                                                                                                 
penalties imposed on [BAMS] by any Associations, resulting from Chargebacks and any 
other fines, fees or penalties imposed by an Association with respect to acts or omissions of 
[Chang’s].” Id. Pursuant to this contractual agreement, BAMS billed P.F. Chang’s 
$1,929,921.57 for costs arising out of a breach of P.F. Chang’s systems. Id. Under its cyber 
policy language, which excluded “any Loss on account of any Claim, or for any Expense . . . 
based upon, arising from or in consequence of any . . . liability assumed by any Insured 
under any contract or agreement,” the court agreed with Federal Insurance Co. that coverage 
for these costs was precluded. Id. at *7-8. 
 91. See, e.g., Evolve MGA Cyber Policy, supra note 33, Exclusions 2, 27; see also 
Raptis & Wilson, supra note 23; RAND Study, supra note 27, at 15-16; infra note 98 and 
accompanying text. 
 92. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.48.010 to .090 (2016); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-552 
(2017); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-110-101 to -108 (2011); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.29, 1798.82 
(Deering Supp. 2018); COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-716 (2018); CONN. GEN STAT. §§ 36a-701b, 
4e-70 (2015); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 12B-101 to -104 (2013); FLA. STAT. §§ 282.0041, 
282.318(2)(i), 501.171 (2017); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-1-910 to -912 (2018); id. § 46-5-214 
(Supp. 2017); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 487N-1 to 7 (West 2008 & Supp. 2017); IDAHO 
CODE §§ 28-51-104 to -107 (2013 & Supp. 2018); 815 ILL COMP. STAT. §§ 530/1 to 530/25 
(2016 & Supp. 2017); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 4-1-11-1 to -10, 24-4.9-1-1 (LexisNexis 2013); 
IOWA CODE §§ 715C.1, 715C.2 (2017); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-7a01 to -7a04 (Supp. 2014); 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 365.732 (LexisNexis Supp. 2017), KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 61.931 to 
61.934 (LexisNexis 2015); LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:3071 to :3080 (2013); ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 10, §§ 1346-1350 (2017); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW §§ 14-3501 to -3508 
(LexisNexis 2013 & Supp. 2017); MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T §§ 10-1301 to -1308 
(LexisNexis 2014); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93H, §§ 1-6 (2013); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 
445.63, 445.72 (2013); MINN. STAT. §§ 325E.61, 325E.64 (2016); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-
24-29 (Supp. 2017); MO. REV. STAT. § 407.1500 (2016); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 2-6-1501 to -
1503, 30-14-1701 to -1736, 33-19-321 (2017); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 87-802 to -805, 87-807 
(2014), §§ 87-801, -806, -808 (amended by 2018 Nebraska Laws L.B. 757); NEV. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 242.183, 603A.010 to .920 (West 2014 & Supp. 2018); N.H. REV. STAT. 
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injured persons to recover damages and attorney’s fees through a private 
right of action,
93
 while others authorize state administrative bodies to assess 
fines based on number of persons affected by the breach or based simply on 
the government’s discretion.
94
 In addition to state laws,
95
 the Federal Trade 
                                                                                                                 
ANN. §§ 359-C:19 to :21 (Supp. 2017); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-161 to -166.1 (West 2018); 
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12C (West Supp. 2017); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 899-aa (LexisNexis 
Supp. 2018); N.Y. STATE TECH. LAW § 208 (McKinney, Westlaw through 2018 Legis. 
Sess.); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 75-61, 75-65 (2017); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 51-30-01 to -07 
(2018); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1347.12, 1349.19, 1349.191, 1349.192 (LexisNexis 2018); 
24 OKLA. STAT. §§ 161-166 (2011); 74 OKLA. STAT. § -3113.1 (2011); OREGON REV. STAT. 
§§ 646A.600 to .628 (2017); 73 PA. STAT. §§ 2301-2329 (Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess. 
Act 76); 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 49.3-1 to .3-6 (West Supp. 2018); S.C. CODE ANN. § 
39-1-90 (Supp. 2017); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-40-1 to -8 (2017); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 8-
4-119 (2016), 47-18-2107 (Supp. 2016); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 521.002, 521.053 
(West Supp. 2017); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-44-101 to -102 (West 2010); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 
9, §§ 2430 (amended by 2018 Vermont Laws No. 171 (H.764)), 2435 (Supp. 2017); VA. 
CODE ANN. § 18.2-186.6 (Supp. 2018); id. § 32.1-127.1:05 (2015); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 
19.255.010, 42.56.590 (2016); W.VA. CODE ANN. §§ 46A-2A-101 to -105 (LexisNexis 
2015); WIS. STAT. § 134.98 (2016); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-12-501 to -509 (2017); D.C. 
CODE §§ 28-3851 to -3853 (2013); 9 GUAM CODE ANN. §§ 48.10 to .80 (Westlaw through 
Pub. L. No. 34-081); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 10 §§ 4051-55 (2011); V.I. CODE tit. 14, §§ 2208, 
2209 (2012); Alabama Data Breach Notification Act of 2018, 2018 Alabama Laws Act 
2018-396 (S.B. 318) (codified as amended at ALA. CODE §§ 8-38-1 to -12). It should be 
noted that the term “PII” is used loosely in this Article, as the definitions of “breach,” 
“personal information” and other terms vary from state to state, and a breach of one 
particular type of “PII” may require notification of affected individuals in one state, but not 
another. 
 93. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.48.080(b), 45.50.471-45.50.531 (2016); CAL. CIV. 
CODE §§ 1798.29, 1798.80, 1798.82, 1798.84 (Deering Supp. 2018); D.C. CODE § 28-
3853(a) (2013); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 487N-3(b) (West 2008); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 
530/20, 505/10 (2016 & Supp. 2017); LA. STAT. ANN. § 51:3075 (2013); MD. CODE ANN., 
COM. LAW §§ 13-408, 14-3508 (West Supp. 2017); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 603A.900 (2017); 
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 75-16, 16.1, 65(i) (2017); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 359-C:21(I) (2009); 
N.J. STAT. ANN. 56:8-19 (West 2018); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-11-490(G), 39-1-90(G) (2017); 
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-18-2105(d), 47-18-2107(h) (2013 & Supp. 2017); VA. CODE ANN. § 
18.2-186.6(I) (Supp. 2018); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 19.255.010(13)(a)-(c), 42.56.590(12)(a)-
(c) (2016). For concerns about privately brought lawsuits brought against the insured, see 
supra Section IV.A. 
 94. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 93A § 4, 93H § 6 (2013) (entitling attorney general 
to injunctive relief or $5,000 for each violation along with reasonable costs and attorney’s 
fees); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 899-aa (LexisNexis Supp. 2018) (entitling court to impose up 
to the greater of $5000 or $10 per failed notification [not to exceed $150,000] in fines where 
knowledge or recklessness is found). See generally supra note 92 and accompanying text.  
 95. Included among state privacy laws are the notice statutes, discussed supra note 92, 
as well as other privacy regulations outside the scope of this article, like the New York 
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Commission (FTC) has authority to enforce the identity theft and privacy 
requirements of the Gramm Leach Bliley Act (GLBA)
96
 and the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act (FCRA),
97
 as well as those found to be implicit in the 
prohibitions on unfairness and deception in the Federal Trade Commission 
Act (FTCA).
98
 Where healthcare information is involved, the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) and the 
Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health 
(HITECH) Act also come into play.
99
 
Furthermore, public outcry after breaches like Equifax’s has instigated 
renewed interest in cyber risk from regulators, meaning that still more 
enforcement might loom on the horizon.
100
 Members of Congress have 
repeatedly remarked upon the importance of addressing cyber risks in 
committee hearings.
101
 Recent activity and rumors suggest that the 
                                                                                                                 
Department of Financial Services cybersecurity regulation made effective August 28, 2017. 
See 23 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 500 (2018) (setting forth more stringent 
requirements for New York financial services companies). 
 96. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6809, 6821-6929 (2012). 
 97. Id. §§ 1681-1681x. 
 98. Id. §§ 41-58. The Act allows the FTC to investigate and pursue actions against an 
organization whose activity qualifies as a practice that “causes or is likely to cause 
substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves 
and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.” Id. § 45(n). 
The FTC has used this authority to bring actions against companies on the theory that 
inadequate cybersecurity is an “unfair trade practice.” See, e.g., Uber Techs. Inc., F.T.C. No. 
C-1523054, at 2 (Aug. 21, 2017) (decision and order) (prohibiting misrepresentations by 
Uber or its representatives/agents regarding extent to which it protects people’s privacy and 
mandating Uber maintain a comprehensive privacy program to ensure confidentiality of 
personal information); Petco Animal Supplies, Inc., 139 F.T.C. 102, 107 (2005) (stating the 
violation of company’s own privacy policy was alleged to be “unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices”); Geocities, 127 F.T.C. 94 (1999). 
 99. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub. L. No. 
104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1181-1187 (2012)); Health Information 
Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5, §§ 13001-
13424, 123 Stat. 115, 226-79 (2009) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 17901-17953 (2012)); 45 
C.F.R. §§ 164.102-.534 (2017) (the HIPAA privacy rule). CRE stakeholders involved with 
hospitals, nursing homes, assisted living facilities, or similar buildings involving storage of 
large amounts of medical information must be aware of this unique exposure and have it 
insured accordingly. 
 100. See, e.g., Office of Attorney General Maura Healey, AG Healey Launches Online 
Data Breach Reporting Portal, MASS.GOV (Feb. 1, 2018) https://www.mass.gov/news/ag-
healey-launches-online-data-breach-reporting-portal. 
 101. Rep. Joe Barton (R-TX), for example, called on Congress to “put some teeth” into 
cybersecurity enforcement by creating federal statutory data breach penalties. Bernard & 
Cowley, supra note 15. At a congressional hearing on the Equifax breach, Barton lamented, 
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Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) may begin to enforce 
privacy standards against financial firms as part of its broad statutory 
authority.
102
 Perhaps most significantly, the European Union (EU) recently 
rolled out its much-anticipated General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR), which threatens CRE insureds with properties in EU countries 
with incredibly stringent and harsh penalties for data breaches.
103
 Despite 
                                                                                                                 
“We could have this hearing every year from now on if we don’t do something to change the 
current system.” Id. John Ratcliffe (R-TX) likened the importance of cyber insurance to 
homeowner’s insurance in a statement made in his capacity as Chairman of the House 
Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection and Security Technologies Subcommittee. See 
Jimmy H. Koo, More Incident Data Needed on Cyber Insurance, BLOOMBERG LAW: 
PRIVACY & DATA SECURITY (Mar. 28, 2016), https://www.bna.com/incident-data-needed-
n57982069086/. Congress has attempted to pass federal data-breach-notification laws in the 
past on numerous occasions. Siemens & Beck, supra note 27 at *8. Several already-enacted 
laws also indicate the federal government’s general interest in cybersecurity, although these 
laws mostly just direct already-existing federal agencies to be aware of and track cyber 
threats and have procedures in place to prevent breaches on their own systems. See, e.g., 
Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-274, 128 Stat. 2971 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7421-7464 (2012)); Federal Information Security Modernization 
Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-283, 128 Stat. 3073 (codified at 44 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3558 
(2012)); Cybersecurity Workforce Assessment Act, Pub. L. No. 113-246, 128 Stat. 2880 
(2014) (codified at 6 U.S.C. § 146 (2012)); Border Patrol Agent Pay Reform Act of 2014, 
Pub. L. No. 113-277, 128 Stat. 2995 (codified at 6 U.S.C. §§ 146-147 (2012)); National 
Cybersecurity Protection Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-282, 128 Stat. 3066 (codified at 6 
U.S.C. §§ 148-150 (2012)). President Obama established the Commission on Enhancing 
National Cybersecurity in 2016 to investigate whether the government should have some 
role to play in cyber insurance itself. See Joyce, supra note 34. 
 102. See Dwolla, Inc., CFPB No. 2016-CFPB-0007, at 26 (Mar. 2, 2016) (consent order) 
(finding that Dwolla Inc.’s data security representations were “deceptive” under Consumer 
Financial Protection Act); Michael Gordon, et al., BNA Insights: The CFPB and Data 
Security Enforcement, BLOOMBERG LAW (June 8, 2016), https://www.bna.com/bna-insights-
cfpb-n57982073820/; Thomas Pahl, The CFPB Is a Sleeping Giant on Data Security. Let's 
Not Wake It, THE HILL (Dec. 28, 2016, 12:00 PM EST), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-
blog/finance/311974-the-cfpb-is-a-sleeping-giant-on-data-security-lets-not-wake-it (opining 
that CFPB should stay out of data breach enforcement matters). 
 103. See Council Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J.(L 119) 1 on the Protection of Natural 
Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such 
Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) [hereinafter 
GDPR]. The GDPR took effect on May 25, 2018. Id. art. 51(4), at 65. Noncompliance with 
the GDPR can result in fines of up to four percent of a company’s global revenue or €20 
million, whichever is greater. Id. art. 83(5); see also Mitzi Hill, GDPR: Good Defense = 
Prepared + Responsive!, TAYLOR ENGLISH DUMA LLP (Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.taylor 
english.com/blogs-emerging-markets,gdpr-good-defense-prepared-responsive. Disturbingly, 
it is mostly unknown whether GDPR fines could actually be covered by insurance, as 
coverage may depend on whether local regulators or courts deem that such fines are 
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the occurrence of Brexit in 2016, the Data Protection Act in the United 
Kingdom may be enforced with similar rigor.
104
 
CRE insureds must confirm that costs related to compliance with these 
statutes and any subsequent enforcement thereof are covered under their 
policies. Fortunately, many cyber policies currently offer coverage for the 
regulatory investigations and fines, fees, and penalties associated with the 
above,
105
 where standard commercial general liability policies fall short.
106
 
C. Derivative and Shareholder Litigation 
In the case of publicly traded REITs or any publicly traded companies 
with real estate, the disclosure of customer or tenant information, valuable 
trade secrets, or other sensitive commercial information that leads to a drop 
in the company’s stock price could spawn fiduciary or shareholder 
derivative litigation
107
 or securities class actions
108
 against the company and 
                                                                                                                 
“punitive” damages, which many jurisdictions say are uninsurable. See Seth Row, Will Your 
Cyber Insurance Cover GDPR Fines and Penalties?, MILLER NASH GRAHAM & DUNN (May 
21, 2018), https://www.nwpolicyholder.com/2018/05/will-your-cyber-insurance-cover-gdpr-
fines-penalties/;Theodore F. Claypoole, Your Cyber Insurance Policy May Not Cover 
GDPR, WOMBLE BOND DICKINSON (Sep. 21, 2018), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/ 
your-cyber-insurance-policy-may-not-cover-gdpr-fines-and-liabilities; The Price of Data 
Security: A Guide to the Insurability of GDPR Fines Across Europe, AON & DLA PIPER 
(May 2018), http://www.aon.com/attachments/risk-services/Aon_DLA-Piper-GDPR-Fines-
Guide_Final_May2018.pdf. 
 104. See Various Claimants v. Wm Morrisons Supermarket PLC [2017] EWHC 311 
(QB) [197] (holding employer vicariously liable for criminal data breaches caused by rogue 
employee). 
 105. Evolve MGA Cyber Policy, supra note 33, Insuring Clause 1, Section B. Note, 
however, that costs related to industry-wide regulatory investigations are excluded under the 
JLT policy. See JLT Asset Management Cyber Policy, supra note 26, Exclusion 18 
(excluding “any industry-wide, non-firm specific, inquiry or action by any governmental, 
regulatory or statutory body”). Small wrinkles such as this underscore the omnipresent 
importance of reading each specific policy word by word. 
 106. See discussion infra Section V.B. 
 107. See Elizabeth E. McGinn et al., The Board of Directors and Cybersecurity: Setting 
up the Right Structure, 103 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 8, at 458, 461-62 (Aug. 26, 2014). 
 108. See generally Complaint, Yuan v. Facebook, Inc., No. 3:18-cv-01725, 2018 WL 
1400036 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2018). Guidance from the SEC Division of Corporation 
Finance warns that compliance with existing disclosure requirements under the securities 
laws (e.g., Exchange Act Rules 12b-20, 14a-9 and 10b-5) may require disclosure of: 
 1) Risk factors relating to a potential cyber incident, including known or 
threatened attacks; 
 2) Costs or other consequences associated with known cyber incidents or 
the risk of potential incidents, where the costs of such incidents individually or 
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its individual directors and officers. Although the intent of cyber insurance 
is generally to provide coverage on behalf of the company and not 
individuals, some policy forms include directors and officers under the 
definition of “insured persons”—but troublingly, many cyber policies often 
exclude securities claims altogether.
109
 Depending on the policy language, 
many directors’ and officers’ (“D&O”) liability policy forms could provide 
defense and indemnity regardless of whether the claims against the 
directors and officers arise out of a cyber event.
110
 
V. Traditional Insurance Solutions 
There are five types of policies that could conceivably provide coverage 
for some of the risks discussed here: property, commercial general liability, 
crime, terrorism, and D&O. This part will discuss the possible cyber 
coverages (or lack thereof) provided by all five. 
A. All-Risk Property Insurance 
A layperson might believe that property insurance should cover direct 
losses resulting from system failures (e.g., loss of tangible property and 
data, and related business interruption costs).
111
 All-risk (also called 
“special form”) property policies offer insureds coverage for physical 
                                                                                                                 
collectively represent a material event, through disclosure in the Management 
Discussion and Analysis section of the registrant's annual report; 
 3) Cyber incidents that materially affect a registrant’s products, services, or 
relationships with customers and suppliers; 
 4) Material legal proceedings involving cyber incidents; and 
 5) Any material impact of cyber security, both pre- and post-incident, on the 
registrant’s financial statements. 
Siemens & Beck, supra note 27, at *8 (citing DIV. OF CORP. FIN., SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, 
CF DISCLOSURE GUIDANCE: TOPIC NO. 2 – CYBERSECURITY (2011), https://www.sec.gov/ 
divisions/corpfin/guidance/cfguidance-topic2.htm#_edn3 [hereinafter CF DISCLOSURE 
GUIDANCE]). As part of the first prong, the SEC advises that disclosure of “relevant 
insurance coverage” may be relevant to the extent material for purposes of Regulation S-K 
Item 503(c), presenting yet another compelling reason that every business should consider 
cyber insurance. See CF DISCLOSURE GUIDANCE, supra; see also Commission Statement and 
Guidance on Public Company Cybersecurity Disclosures Release Nos. 33-10459, 34-82746, 
83 Fed. Reg. 8166 (Feb. 26, 2018) https://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2018/33-10459.pdf 
(clarifying same guidance). 
 109. See, e.g., JLT Asset Management Cyber Policy, supra note 26, Exclusions 19-20; 
Am. Int’l Grp., Security and Privacy Coverage Section, supra note 26, Exclusion 3(f); 
RAND Study, supra note 27, at 16. 
 110. See discussion infra Section V.E. 
 111. See supra Section IV.A (describing nature of first party cyber risks). 
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damage to their property and, if purchased, related business interruption 
costs.
112
 Yet these policies generally do not provide coverage for loss of 
electronic data, and moreover, they usually contain cyber exclusions 
specifically precluding coverage for any losses arising from, inter alia, 
system failures, corruption of data, and loss of use of any computer.
113
 
Historically, property insurance responded to costs relating to a computer 
virus infecting a business’ network.
114
 But beginning in 2002, insurance 
carriers began adding exclusionary language like the NMA 2914 
endorsement to their policies, which makes their intent to exclude such 
events from coverage relatively clear:  
This Policy does not insure loss, damage, destruction, distortion, 
erasure, corruption or alteration of ELECTRONIC DATA from 
any cause whatsoever (including but not limited to COMPUTER 
VIRUS) or loss of use, reduction in functionality, cost, expense 
of whatsoever nature resulting therefrom, regardless of any other 
cause or event contributing concurrently or in any other 
sequence to the loss.
115
 
                                                                                                                 
 112. See Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Form No. CP 10 30 10 12; All Risks Coverage, INT’L 
RISK MGMT. INST., INC., https://www.irmi.com/online/insurance-glossary/terms/a/all-risks-
coverage.aspx (last visited Feb 8, 2018). 
 113. See PR 9514 (on file with author). This endorsement states that the insurer will not 
pay for Damage or Consequential Loss directly or indirectly caused by, consisting of, or 
arising from: 
 1. Any functioning or malfunctioning of the internet or similar facility, or of 
any intranet or private network or similar facility,  
 2. Any corruption, destruction, distortion, erasure or other loss or damage to 
data, software, or any kind of programming or instruction set,  
 3. Loss of use or functionality whether partial or entire of data, coding, 
program, software, any computer or computer system or other device 
dependent upon any microchip or embedded logic, and any ensuing liability or 
failure of the Insured to conduct business. 
Id.; see also Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Form No. CP 01 70 (standard endorsement introduced 
to exclude electronic data from ISO standard Building and Personal Property coverage 
form). 
 114. See, e.g., Lambrecht & Assocs., Inc. v. State Farm Lloyds, 119 S.W.3d 16, 26 (Tex. 
App. 2003) (holding that costs arising from a computer virus, including server replacement, 
were covered by business insurance policy); see also Am. Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co. v. 
Ingram Micro, Inc., No. 99–185 TUC ACM, 2000 WL 726789, at *3 (D. Ariz. Apr. 18, 
2000) (concluding that insured was “physically damaged” by power outage which affected 
computer systems). 
 115. See NMA 2914A Electronic Data Endorsement C (2015) (endorsement created by 
London’s Non-Marine Association) (on file with author) (emphasis added); see also NMA 
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This language signifies a straightforward elimination of coverage for first-
party electronic data losses that could be covered under a property policy.  
Some property policies can be endorsed to provide limited coverage for 
first-party losses resulting from cyber events.
116
 In most cases, however, a 
data intrusion would likely neither constitute a direct physical loss nor a 
covered cause of loss, thereby making the possibility of business 
interruption coverage for cyber events on a property policy very slim.
117
 
                                                                                                                 
2915A Electronic Data Endorsement D (2015) (on file with author) (excluding “loss, 
damage, destruction, distortion, erasure, corruption or alteration of [electronic data],” and 
any “loss of use, reduction in functionality, cost, expense of whatsoever nature resulting” 
from that loss of data); NMA 2912 (on file with author) (excluding losses arising out of the 
“(i) loss of, alteration of, or damage to, or (ii) a reduction in the functionality, availability or 
operation of” computer systems, hardware, programs, software, data information repository, 
microchip, integrated circuit or similar devices in computer equipment or non-computer 
equipment); NMA 2928 (on file with author); CL 380 (on file with author) (excluding all 
loss, damage and liability directly or indirectly caused by, contributed to by, or arising from, 
the use or operation “as a means for inflicting harm” of any computer, computer system, 
computer software program, malicious code, computer virus or process or any other 
electronic system); Michael Rossi, The End of Computer Virus Coverage as We Know It?, 
INT’L RISK MGMT. INST., INC. (May 2002), https://www.irmi.com/articles/expert-
commentary/the-end-of-computer-virus-coverage-as-we-know-it/. 
 116. See Computer Systems Damage, Zurich EDGE-100-B (2010) (on file with author). 
This Zurich policy form states: 
The Company will pay for direct physical loss of or damage to the Insured's 
Electronic Data, Programs, Software and the actual Time Element loss 
sustained, as provided by this Policy, during the Period of Interruption directly 
resulting from mysterious disappearance of code, any failure, malfunction, 
deficiency, deletion, fault, Computer Virus or corruption to the Insured’s 
Electronic Data, Programs, Software at an Insured Location. The Company will 
also pay for such loss or damage that may arise out of or result from any 
authorized or unauthorized access in, of, or to any computer, communication 
system, file server, networking equipment, computer system, computer 
hardware, data processing equipment, computer memory, microchip, 
microprocessor, integrated circuit or similar device. 
 This Coverage will only apply when the Period of Interruption exceeds the 
time shown as Qualifying Period in the Qualifying Period clause of the 
Declarations section. If the Qualifying Period is exceeded, then this Policy will 
pay for the amount of loss in excess of the Policy Deductible, but not more than 
the limit applying to this Coverage. 
Id. Note, however, that this coverage is typically subject to a low sublimit (e.g., $1,000,000) 
as well as a “Qualifying Period” whereby the insured self-insures for a specified period of 
time until the coverage kicks in (e.g., forty-eight hours). See id.  
 117. See Suriano & Kaliner, supra note 61 (discussing the triggering of business 
interruption coverage on a typical policy). But see Ashland Hosp. Corp. v. Affiliated FM Ins. 
Co., No. 11-16-DLB-EBA, 2013 WL 4400516 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 14, 2013) (holding insurer 
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With respect to data restoration or system recovery costs, even if the 
endorsements excluding electronic data can be successfully removed during 
negotiations, the associated premium increase would likely be cost-
prohibitive. Further, policy forms’ exclusion of “electronic data” from the 
definition of covered property would still render potential coverage for 
cyber risks an unsettling question mark at best. Given all these difficulties, 
an all-risk property policy is likely not a good place to turn for any 
meaningful cyber coverage. 
Cyber policies, as discussed above, generally do cover the restoration of 
any lost or corrupted data accompanying a cyber event, as well as some 
business interruption costs related thereto.
118
 Given that business 
interruption is one of the most critical and necessary aspects of cyber 
coverage for CRE insureds, this represents one of the reasons cyber policies 
could be a worthwhile purchase.
119
 On the other hand, many cyber policies 
exclude or attempt to sublimit reimbursement for reputational harm, loss of 
future revenue, and tangible property damage arising out of cyber events.
120
 
Given the interconnectedness of the infrastructure of a smart building with 
the computer system and data therein, CRE insureds should want coverage 
for those risks in particular.
121
 CRE insureds must carefully inspect their 
policy language in order to determine whether the stand-alone cyber policy 
offers any meaningful value or protection at all over the standard “all-risk” 
property policy.  
B. Commercial General Liability Insurance 
The commercial general liability (CGL) policy may be another place to 
turn for coverage of cyber risks. CGL policies pay, under “Coverage A,” 
for sums that an insured becomes legally obligated to pay due to an 
occurrence that results in property damage or bodily injury, with property 
damage being defined as “[p]hysical injury to tangible property, including 
all resulting loss of use of that property.”
122
 Most CGL forms now state that 
                                                                                                                 
was required to pay for loss of data storage network where such loss was caused by extreme 
temperatures which caused physical damage to data at microscopic level). 
 118. See supra Section III.A, III.B. 
 119. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.  
 120. See supra Section III.B; 2 STUART A. PANENSKY, DATA SECURITY & PRIVACY LAW § 
14:6, Westlaw (database updated June 2018) (noting the gap in available coverage for 
physical property damage caused by a data breach). 
 121. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 122. See, e.g., Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Form No. CG 00 01 04 13, Commercial General 
Liability Coverage Form, Definition (17)(a) (2012) [hereinafter Ins. Servs. Office, 2012 
Commercial General Liability Coverage Form]. This limiting definition was added in 2001, 
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“electronic data is not tangible property,”
123
 and explicitly exclude 
“Damages arising out of the loss of, loss of use of, damage to, corruption 
of, inability to access, or inability to manipulate electronic data.”
124
 While 
courts have accordingly been reluctant to categorize electronically stored 
data as “tangible property” for purposes of triggering a CGL policy,
125
 
                                                                                                                 
effectively eliminating the “Computer Fraud” coverage which in preceding years was an 
additional coverage that could be purchased and endorsed to the CGL form. See Virginia N. 
Roddy, Expanding Risks, Growing Market: Cyber Insurance Today, DRI FOR DEF., Oct. 
2017, at 80. Computer Fraud coverage is still available in the market, but only on 
commercial crime policies. See infra Section V.C. 
 123. See, e.g., Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Form No. CG 00 01 12 04, Commercial General 
Liability Coverage Form, Definition (17) (2000). 
 124. See, e.g., Ins. Servs. Office, 2012 Commercial General Liability Coverage Form, 
supra note 124, Exclusion (p). This policy form excludes: 
Damages arising out of the loss of, loss of use of, damage to, corruption of, 
inability to access, or inability to manipulate electronic data. However, this 
exclusion does not apply to liability for damages because of “bodily injury”. As 
used in this exclusion, electronic data means information, facts or programs 
stored as or on, created or used on, or transmitted to or from computer 
software, including systems and applications software, hard or floppy disks, 
CDROMs, tapes, drives, cells, data processing devices or any other media 
which are used with electronically controlled equipment. 
Id.; see also RSVT Holdings, LLC v. Main St. Am. Assurance Co., 25 N.Y.S.3d 712, 713-14 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2016) (siding with insurer by applying electronic data exclusion to lawsuit 
arising out of restaurant’s data breach). 
 125. See Liberty Corp. Capital Ltd. v. Sec. Safe Outlet, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 2d 891, 901 
(E.D. Ky. 2013) (noting that customer email addresses are not tangible property), aff'd, 577 
F. App’x 399 (6th Cir. 2014); Am. Online, Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 347 F.3d 89, 96 
(4th Cir. 2003) (applying Virginia law and relying on dictionary definitions of “tangible 
property” to differentiate between coverage for lawsuits arising out of damage to hardware 
versus software); Lucker Mfg. v. Home Ins. Co., 23 F.3d 808 (3d Cir. 1994) (applying 
Pennsylvania and Wisconsin law and holding that system design was intangible because its 
value emanated from an idea and not from its memorializing medium); Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. 
Prof'l Data Servs., Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15859, at *21 (D. Kan. July 18, 2003) 
(relying on America Online to hold that loss of use of software and data is not damage to 
“tangible property because neither has any physical substance [or] is perceptible to the 
senses”); State Auto Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Midwest Computs. & More, 147 F. Supp. 2d 
1113, 1116 (W.D. Okla. 2001) (stating in dicta that electronic data is not tangible property 
because it “cannot be touched, held, or sensed by the human mind”); Seagate Tech., Inc. v. 
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1155 (N.D. Cal. 1998); Greco & 
Traficante v. Fid. & Guar. Ins. Co., No. D052179, 2009 WL 162068, at *5-6 (Cal. Ct. App. 
Jan. 26, 2009); Better Imaging Facilitators, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., No. 
B188520, 2006 WL 3187150, at *3-5 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 6, 2006); Ward Gen. Ins. Servs., 
Inc. v. Emp’rs Fire Ins. Co., 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 844, 851 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (ruling loss of 
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insureds have occasionally found an effective way around this by arguing 
that because computer hardware is clearly tangible property, any lawsuits 
relating to losses anent physical components of the computers themselves 
must be covered under Coverage A.
126
 Therefore, if a real estate cyber 
attack physically damages a building’s computer systems, any lawsuits 
deriving therefrom could trigger the insurer’s duty to defend on a CGL 
policy. Nevertheless, it likely would be a grave mistake to rely on this 
loophole for all cyber liability coverage, given that (1) the insurer likely 
will fight on this point, and (2) much of the liability risk stems from privacy 
lawsuits rather than tangible property damage.
127
 
CGL policies also insure “personal and advertising injury” resulting 
from offenses such as violation of the right to privacy under Coverage B.
128
 
Included within this scope of coverage is liability arising out of an “[o]ral 
or written publication, in any manner, of material that violates a person’s 
right of privacy.”
129
 Some courts have suggested or held that a disclosure of 
PII resulting from a data breach constitutes a “publication” and, 
consequently, that CGL carriers owe a duty to defend and potentially 
indemnify from lawsuits arising out of such disclosure.
130
 Unfortunately, 
                                                                                                                 
stored computer data is not “direct physical loss”); Warner v. Fire Ins. Exch., 281 Cal. Rptr. 
635 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (using the same analysis as America Online).  
 126. See, e.g., Eyeblaster, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 613 F.3d 797, 802 (8th Cir. 2010) 
(holding that “[t]he plain meaning of tangible property includes computers, and the Sefton 
complaint alleges repeatedly the ‘loss of use’ of his computer” and “conclud[ing] . . . the 
allegations are within the scope of the General Liability policy,” despite the policy’s 
exclusion of electronic data from the definition of “tangible property”); Centillium 
Commc’ns v. Atl. Mut. Ins. Co., 528 F. Supp. 2d 940, 948-49 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (applying 
California law and holding that allegations that semiconductor chips physically injured other 
components of routers triggered insurer’s duty to defend); State Auto Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. 
v. Midwest Computs. & More, 147 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1116 (W.D. Okla. 2001) (“Because a 
computer clearly is tangible property, an alleged loss of use of computers constitutes 
‘property damage’ within the meaning of plaintiff's policy.”); Retail Sys., Inc. v. CNA Ins. 
Cos., 469 N.W.2d 735, 737 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (holding data on computer tape 
containing results of a political survey constituted tangible property because “[t]he data on 
the tape was of permanent value and was integrated completely with the physical property of 
the tape.”). 
 127. See supra Section IV.A and accompanying text. 
 128. See, e.g., Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Form No. CG 00 01 04 13, Commercial General 
Liability Coverage Form: Personal and Advertising Injury Liability (2013).  
 129. Id. at Definition (14)(e) (emphasis added). 
 130. Travelers Indem. Co. of Am. v. Portal Healthcare Sols., LLC, 644 F. App’x 245, 
247-48 (4th Cir. 2016) (holding that data breach constituted “publication” under CGL 
personal and advertising coverage); see also Am. States Ins. Co. v. Capital Assocs. of 
Jackson Cty., 392 F.3d 939, 941 (7th Cir. 2004) (stating in dicta that “[t]he language reads 
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widely circulated endorsements first introduced in 2014 now exclude 
liability arising out of “Access Or Disclosure Of Confidential Or Personal 
Information” from both Coverages A and B
131
 or explicitly delete privacy 
lawsuits from Coverage B.
132
 Although there is not a substantial amount of 
case law interpreting these endorsements, it seems clear that the intent is to 
negate coverage for invasion-of-privacy lawsuits as part of a renewed effort 
to force insureds to purchase a separate cyber insurance product.
133
 
Followers of the insurance industry understand that whenever there is 
increased regulatory scrutiny for an exposure (as with cyber),
134
 insurers 
look to exclude and segregate the risk from the broadly worded general 
                                                                                                                 
like coverage of the tort of ‘invasion of privacy,’” and “[p]erhaps the language reasonably 
could be understood to cover improper disclosures of Social Security numbers, credit 
records, email addresses, and other details that could facilitate identity theft or spamming”); 
Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. Corcino & Assocs., No. CV 13–3728 GAF (JCx), 2013 WL 
5687527, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2013) (endorsing, tacitly, Hartford’s choice not to dispute 
that accidental posting of confidential information on website was “publication”); Tamm v. 
Hartford Fire Ins. Co., No. 020541BLS2, 2003 WL 21960374, at *4 (Mass. Super. Ct. July 
10, 2003) (holding that revealing private correspondence of the insured and its executives 
via email to outside attorneys constituted “publication” under Coverage B). But see Innovak 
Int’l, Inc. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 280 F. Supp. 3d 1340, 1349 (M.D. Fla. 2017) (holding that 
because third party hackers and not the insured caused the data breach, coverage was barred 
because lawsuit did not arise out of the insured’s oral or written publication); Recall Total 
Info. Mgmt. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 115 A.3d 458, 460 (Conn. 2015). In Recall Total, 
Connecticut’s highest court found that coverage was barred where computer tapes fell out of 
the insured’s transportation contractor’s van and were subsequently stolen. 115 A.3d 458 at 
459-60. This case presented a unique set of facts because there was no computer hack, but 
rather a loss of physical tapes, and also no evidence existed that anyone ever accessed the 
confidential information on the stolen tapes. Id. at 459. 
 131. See, e.g., Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Form No. CG 21 06 05 14, Commercial General 
Liability Exclusions 2(p), I(A-B) (2013) (with limited bodily injury exception); Ins. Servs. 
Office, Inc., Form No. CG 21 07 05 14, Commercial General Liability Exclusion 2(p), I(A-
B) (without limited bodily injury exception) (2013); Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Form No. CG 
21 08 05 14, Commercial General Liability Exclusions I(B)(2) (2013) (excluding “Access 
Or Disclosure Of Confidential Or Personal Information And Data-Related Liability” with 
some variations); SCOTT M. SEAMAN & JASON R. SCHULZE, ALLOCATION OF LOSSES IN 
COMPLEX INSURANCE COVERAGE CLAIMS § 17:2(c), Westlaw (database updated Dec. 2017).  
 132. See, e.g., Ins. Servs. Office, Inc. CG 24 13 04 13 (excluding privacy lawsuits from 
Personal & Advertising Injury coverage). 
 133. See infra note 135 and accompanying text; see also Big 5 Sporting Goods Corp. v. 
Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 635 F. App'x 351 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding CGL insurer had no duty to 
defend lawsuit against insured brought under Song–Beverly Act of 1991 because all 
underlying claims arose from the “alleged violation of the statutory right to privacy,” which 
was excluded under the CGL policy). 
 134. See supra Section IV.B. 
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liability policy in order to force policyholders to pay additional premium 
for a separate policy to insure the risk.
135
  
CRE stakeholders can attempt to negotiate the re-inclusion of electronic 
data in the definition of “tangible property” with brokers and carriers via 
endorsement.
136
 It is uncertain how willing carriers are to remove the 
“Access Or Disclosure Of Confidential Or Personal Information And Data-
Related Liability” exclusions from Coverage B, and even if they are 
willing, the premium might be cost-prohibitive. Further, even if such 
exclusions are left off of policies at a reasonable price, there remains some 
                                                                                                                 
 135. We know this to be true because the insurance industry has publicly acknowledged 
the fact. See Bole, supra note 48 (noting that uncomfortable insurers will “take a ‘hard look’ 
at where cyber cover could appear in [other non-cyber] policies”); Jeffrey P. Klenk, 
Emerging Coverage Issues In Employment Practices Liability Insurance: The Industry 
Perspective On Recent Developments, 21 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 323 (1999) (explaining 
dawn of employment practices exclusion on CGL policy and subsequent policy segregation 
resulted from, inter alia, the Civil Rights Act of 1991); E. Joshua Rosenkranz, The Pollution 
Exclusion Clause Through The Looking Glass, 74 GEO. L.J. 1237 (1986) (explaining dawn 
of pollution exclusion on CGL policy and subsequent policy segregation resulted from, inter 
alia, the RCRA, CERCLA, and other new statutory schemes). Bob O’Leary, president and 
CEO of Philadelphia Insurance Companies even openly predicted and admitted that 
underwriters of traditional lines of insurance will ramp up their exclusionary language as it 
relates to cyber, stating that “[s]ilent cyber cover will be closed down across the industry via 
exclusionary language . . . We did this with pollution cover and saw a quicker take-up rate of 
standalone pollution cover as a result.” Bole, supra note 48 (emphasis added). This is one of 
the economic realities of the insurance industry that on the one hand cannot be overstated, 
but that on the other hand lawyers and academics still struggle to accept as it relates to cyber 
coverage. See, e.g., Erik S. Knutsen, & Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Techno-Neutrality Solution 
To Navigating Insurance Coverage For Cyber Losses, 122 PENN ST. L. REV. 645 (2018) 
(arguing that insurance industry should fold cyber coverage into already-existing traditional 
coverages such as CGL and property). Countless academic writings on cyber insurance 
simply emphasize possible existing cyber coverages on traditional policies rather than 
acknowledging the reality that soon all such coverage will be excluded. See SEAMAN & 
SCHULZE, supra note 131; Larry Bowman, Kenneth Johnston, Dan Klein & Shae Keefe, 
Data Breach: The Aftermath – Insurance Coverage Under CGL Policies for Cyber Security 
Breaches, Hacks, and Malware Attacks, KANE RUSSELL COLEMAN LOGAN PC (Oct. 18, 
2016), https://www.krcl.com/articles/litigation-update/data-breach-aftermath-insurance-
coverage-cgl-policies-cyber-security-breaches-hacks-malware-attacks/; James H. Kallianis, 
Jr., Read The Fine Print – Insurance Coverage Issues Implicated in Data-Breach Claims, 
DRI FOR DEF., Mar. 2015, at 56. 
 136. See Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Form No. CG 04 37 12 04, Commercial General 
Liability Form, Exclusion 2(p) Definition 17(c) (2008). This endorsement changes the 
definition to include: “[L]oss of, loss of use of, damage to, corruption of, inability to access, 
or inability to properly manipulate ‘electronic data,’ resulting from physical injury to 
tangible property. . . . All such loss of ‘electronic data’ shall be deemed to occur at the time 
of the ‘occurrence’ that caused it.” Id. 
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question s as to (1) whether a cyber event resulting from intentional conduct 
would qualify as an accident or an occurrence to trigger the CGL policy;
137
 
and (2) whether a CGL policy would cover a publication initiated by a third 
party (i.e., a hacker) rather than the insured itself.
138
 Accordingly, in terms 
of mitigating third-party liability risk, the cyber policy will likely be a 
necessary avenue of defense for all contract and tort lawsuits and 
government enforcement actions arising out of cyber events for CRE, 
except in circumstances where the insured successfully argues that the 
lawsuit arises out of “physical damage” to “tangible property.” Even then, 
the cyber policy must be carefully reviewed for coverage gaps, because 
bodily injury and property damage are often excluded with critically 
worded carvebacks, leaving an opening for insurance carriers to argue that 





                                                                                                                 
 137. See, e.g., Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Websolv Computing, Inc., 580 F.3d 543, 551-52 
(7th Cir. 2009) (applying Iowa law); Melrose Hotel Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 
432 F. Supp. 2d 488, 511-12 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (applying Pennsylvania law). 
 138. A New York trial court judge in the case between Sony and its insurer Zurich found 
that the oral or written publication must have been committed by the insured itself, and thus 
“an oral or written publication that was perpetrated by the hackers” did not qualify for 
coverage under Sony’s CGL policy. Zurich Am. Ins. v. Sony Corp. of Am., No. 
651982/2011, 2014 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 5141, at *70 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 21, 2014); see also 
Innovak Int’l, Inc v. Hanover Ins. Co., 280 F. Supp. 3d 1340, 1349 (M.D. Fla. 2017); St. 
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Rosen Millennium Inc., Case No. 6:17-cv-540-ORL-41-GJK, 
2018 WL 4732718 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 28, 2018). But see Oscines v. Mt. Hood Ins. Co., No. 
1401-426 (Or. Cir. Ct. July 2, 2015) (holding that Coverage B “in any manner” verbiage 
necessitates coverage of liability arising from release by third-party hackers). 
 139. See Chubb Cyber Policy, supra note 33, Exclusion III(A)(5) (excluding bodily 
injury except in the case of the liability coverage part with respect to “mental injury, mental 
anguish, mental tension, emotional distress, pain and suffering, or shock resulting from an 
Incident”); Evolve MGA Cyber Policy, supra note 33, Exclusion 5 (excluding bodily injury 
and property damage altogether with no carveback). The bodily injury carveback (or lack 
thereof) can be critical because a carrier could use a plaintiff’s assertion of emotional 
distress (together with whatever other privacy claims they are bringing) as an excuse to deny 
defense or deny coverage. Even the risk of death and more physical bodily injury should not 
be disregarded when it comes to cyber insurance. See, e.g., Nicole Perlroth & Clifford 
Krauss, A Cyberattack in Saudi Arabia Had a Deadly Goal. Experts Fear Another Try, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/15/technology/saudi-arabia-
hacks-cyberattacks.html (discussing how attempted hacking of a petrochemical 
manufacturer appears to have sought “to sabotage the firm's operations and trigger an 
explosion”).  
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C. Commercial Crime Insurance 
Commercial crime insurance
140
 may be purchased on a stand-alone basis 
or as part of a CRE insured’s package policy.
141
 The policy typically 
provides coverage for “Computer Fraud,” which is usually defined as: 
[L]oss of or damage to “money,” “securities” and “other 
property” resulting directly from the use of any computer to 
fraudulently cause a transfer of that property from inside the 
“premises” or “banking premises:” (a) To a person (other than a 




Crime policies typically also cover “Funds Transfer Fraud,” often stating 
something to the effect of: “We will pay for the loss of ‘funds’ resulting 
directly from a ‘fraudulent instruction’ directing a financial institution to 
transfer, pay or deliver ‘funds’ from your ‘transfer account.’”
143
  
Under New York law, these two provisions cover dollars lost to “social 
engineering” or “spoofing” schemes.
144
 In Medidata Solutions v. Federal 
Insurance Co.,
145
 a New York federal judge held that Chubb subsidiary 
Federal Insurance Co. had to pay the money that an employee in the 
accounts-payable department of Medidata paid to a malicious party that had 
posed as the company president via email, despite Federal’s argument that 
coverage was negated by the fact that the transfer of money was done by an 
employee with authorization to transfer the funds and that there was no 
“entry or change of data to Medidata’s computer system.”
146
 Federal 
                                                                                                                 
 140. See, e.g., Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Form No. CR 00 23 05 06, Commercial Crime 
Policy (Loss Sustained Form) (2008) [hereinafter Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Commercial Crime 
Policy (Loss Sustained Form)].  
 141. What Is Commercial Crime Insurance?, BOLT INS. AGENCY (Sept. 13, 2012), 
https://www.boltinsurance.com/what-is-commercial-crime-insurance/. 
 142. Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Commercial Crime Policy (Loss Sustained Form), supra 
note 140, Insuring Agreements, Section 6. 
 143. Id. at Section 7. 
 144. See Medidata Sols. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 268 F. Supp. 3d 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2017), aff’d, 729 
F. App’x 117 (2d. Cir. 2018). 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 476-80. On appeal, an insurance trade group filed an amicus brief siding with 
Federal, arguing from a prudential perspective that “[i]f ‘computer fraud’ insurance is 
construed so overbroadly to cover losses resulting from e-mails that fool the insured’s 
employees, who do not take commercially reasonable steps to confirm the substance of the 
e-mails, such insurance will become much harder to obtain and substantially more 
expensive.” Brief for the Sur. & Fid. Ass’n of Am. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant 
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appealed the judgment to the Second Circuit, who subsequently affirmed 
the lower court’s decision.
147
 A few unpublished opinions by the Fifth and 
Ninth Circuits align more with the insurer’s argument that because victims 
of these schemes instruct their own bank to transfer the funds via an agent 
with “authorization,” there cannot have been any computer fraud or funds-
transfer fraud under the above definitions because the loss did not “result 
directly” from a fraudulent instruction using a computer.
148
 Other courts 
tend to agree more with Judge Carter’s reasoning in Medidata.
149
  
The Second Circuit’s decision is incredibly significant in the context of 
this Article because of the vast number of CRE companies based in New 
York and insurers based in Connecticut, two Second Circuit jurisdictions.
150
 
                                                                                                                 
at *14, Medidata Sols., Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 729 F. App’x 117 (2nd Cir. 2018). Of course, 
an interest group’s vague cautionary threat that a certain ruling might make coverage more 
expensive has no bearing on what the law dictates a result to be. 
 147. Medidata Sols. Fed. Ins., 729 F. App’x at 119. 
 148. See Taylor & Lieberman v. Fed. Ins. Co., 681 F. App’x 627 (9th Cir. 2017); Apache 
Corp. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 662 F. App’x 252 (5th Cir. 2016); Posco Daewoo Am. Corp. v. 
Allnex USA, Inc., No. CV 17-483, 2017 WL 4922014 (D.N.J. Oct. 31, 2017); Am. Tooling 
Ctr., Inc. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am., No. 16-12108, 2017 WL 3263356 (E.D. 
Mich. Aug. 1, 2017), rev’d, 895 F.3d 455 (6th Cir. 2018); Brick Warehouse LP v. Chubb 
Ins. Co. of Can., 2017 ABQB 413 (Can.). Posco Daewoo is a somewhat distinct case 
because it involved a “reverse” social engineering scheme, wherein the intended payee of the 
funds, not the payor, asserted a claim under its own crime policy for recovery of funds that a 
malicious actor had tricked the payor into paying out. 2017 WL 4922014, at *1-2. The court 
then understandably held that because the claimant had no actual property interest in the 
money (at least, not yet), they then had no good claim under the crime policy. Id. at *6-7. 
Therefore, the Poscoe Daewoo holding does not necessarily portend New Jersey courts’ or 
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals’ alignment with the view of the Fifth Circuit and the 
Michigan court. 
 149. See Am. Tooling Ctr., Inc. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am., 895 F.3d 455 (6th 
Cir. 2018) (holding insured suffered “direct loss . . . directly caused by . . . computer fraud” 
when it mistakenly transferred funds); State Bank of Bellingham v. BancInsure Inc. n/k/a 
Red Rock Ins. Co., 823 F.3d 456 (8th Cir. 2016) (applying the concurrent causation doctrine 
under Minnesota law and holding that financial institution bond holder had to pay insured 
bank for illegal transfer of funds from bank by criminal third party despite violations of 
policies and procedures governing computer security by bank’s employees, an excluded peril 
under the financial institution bond); Principle Sols. Grp., LLC v. Ironshore Indem., Inc., 
No. 1:15-CV-4130-RWS, 2016 WL 4618761 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 30, 2016); see also Complaint, 
RB International Fin. USA EEC v. Allianz Glob. Risks U.S. Ins. Co., No. 1:17-cv-08690 
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2017).  
 150. Additionally, on the typical Bermuda policy form, the governing law in case of a 
dispute is New York. See Mina Martin, The Good and Evil of Permissive Notices of 
Occurrences, LAW360 (Nov. 9, 2017, 10:51 AM EST), https://www.law360.com/ 
insurance/articles/982446/the-good-and-evil-of-permissive-notices-of-occurrences. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol71/iss2/3
2019]       INSURANCE OF CYBER RISKS FOR REAL ESTATE 435 
 
 
In the meantime, the rest of the country should follow Judge Carter’s lead, 
as the divergent contemporaneous case law simply defies reason. The court 
in Apache Corporation v. Great American Insurance Co., for example, 
based on similar facts as Medidata, used the following pretzel logic to 
justify its ruling that the loss did not “result directly” from computer fraud:  
The email was part of the scheme; but, the email was merely 
incidental to the occurrence of the authorized transfer of money. 
To interpret the computer-fraud provision as reaching any 
fraudulent scheme in which an email communication was part of 
the process would . . . convert the computer-fraud provision to 
one for general fraud.
151
 
As Judge Story of the Northern District of Georgia pointed out in Principle 
Solutions Group LLC v. Ironshore Indemnity Inc., “If some employee 
interaction between the fraud and the loss [i]s sufficient to allow [the 
insurer] to be relieved from paying under the provision at issue, the 
provision would be rendered ‘almost pointless’ and would result in illusory 
coverage.”
152
 This conclusion is correct because the nature of fraud is that a 
misrepresentation by a malicious party induces action by an innocent party 
(i.e., action that the innocent party would not have taken but for the 
misrepresentation).
153
 To suggest that an “authorized” action by the 
insured’s agent(s) somehow would negate fraud coverage essentially 
renders the computer fraud coverage useless, as it undercuts the very 
definition of fraud itself.
154
 The email is not “incidental” to the occurrence 
                                                                                                                 
 151. Apache Corp., 662 F. App’x. at 258. 
 152. Civil Action No. 1:15-CV-4130-RWS, 2016 WL 4618761 at *5 (quoting Apache 
Corp., No. 4:14-CV-237, 2015 WL 7709584, at *3 (S.D. Texas Aug. 7, 2015)). In finding 
that money paid to a spoofing scammer was covered under a crime policy’s Funds Transfer 
Fraud provision in Medidata, Judge Carter echoed this sentiment, summarizing the scenario 
succinctly and accurately: 
It is also undisputed that the accounts payable personnel would not have 
initiated the wire transfer, but for, the third parties' manipulation of the emails. 
The fact that the accounts payable employee willingly pressed the send button 
on the bank transfer does not transform the bank wire into a valid transaction. 
To the contrary, the validity of the wire transfer depended upon several high 
level employees' knowledge and consent which was only obtained by trick. As 
the parties are well aware, larceny by trick is still larceny. 
278 F. Supp. 3d 471, 480 (S.D.N.Y. 2017). 
 153. See Fraud, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“fraud n. (14c) 1. A 
knowing misrepresentation or knowing concealment of a material fact made to induce 
another to act to his or her detriment.” (emphasis added)).  
 154. See id.; see also Knutsen & Stempel, supra note 135, at 663-64. 
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of the money transfer in any of these cases, but rather the direct cause. 
Blend this common-sense rationale with the bedrock insurance-law 
principle that any policy ambiguities are to be construed in favor of the 
insured,
155
 and one reasonably could conclude that future court decisions 
will side more with Judge Carter and Judge Story rather than the 
unpublished Fifth and Ninth Circuit opinions. 
Theft and fraudulent transfer of funds by malicious actors is a significant 
concern for CRE because a substantial amount of acquisitions, dispositions, 
and financing of properties occur through web transactions, ripe territory 
for computer scam artists.
156
 If the insured purchases the coverage for theft 
by non-employees, it seems undisputed that commercial crime policies 
would cover a hacker’s unlawful entry into a computer system whereby the 
hacker unlawfully transfers funds himself directly (standard larceny).
157
 
Under Medidata and related cases, moreover, the related computer-fraud 
coverage also should cover money lost to a “social engineer” or “spoofing” 
scam artist, and the purchase of certain computer-fraud riders can even 
cover related losses arising out of such incidents, including credit card fees 
                                                                                                                 
 155. See, e.g., Emp'rs Ins. Co. of Ala. v. Jeff Gin Co., 378 So. 2d 693, 695 (Ala. 1979); 
Hahn v. Alaska Title Guar. Co., 557 P.2d 143, 144 (Alaska 1976); S. Title Ins. Co. v. Oller, 
595 S.W.2d 681, 683 (Ark. 1980); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Namerow, 778 A.2d 168, 177 
(Conn. 2001); Healy Tibbitts Constr. Co. v. Emp’rs' Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 140 Cal. Rptr. 
375, 379 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977); Res. Ins. Co. v. Pisciotta, 640 P.2d 764, 811 (Cal. 1982); 
Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Robert S., 28 P.3d 889, 896 (Cal. 2001) (Baxter, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part); Carlyle Inv. Mgmt. LLC v. Ace Am. Ins. Co., 131 A.3d 886, 
896 (D.C. 2016); Penzer v. Transp. Ins. Co., 545 F.3d 1303, 1309 (11th Cir. 2008), certified 
question answered, 29 So. 3d 1000 (Fla. 2010); St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 774 F.3d 
702, 709 (11th Cir. 2014) (applying Georgia law); Kemper Nat’l Ins. Cos. v. Heaven Hill 
Distilleries, Inc., 82 S.W.3d 869, 874 (Ky. 2002); Kottenbrook v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 69 
So. 3d 561, 563 (La. Ct. App. 2011); USA Life One Ins. Co. of Ind. v. Nuckolls, 682 N.E.2d 
534, 538 (Ind. 1997); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ferrin, 2002 MT 196, ¶¶ 16, 21, 54 
P.3d 21, 23-24; Nascimento v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., 513 F.3d 273, 277 n.2 (1st Cir. 2008) 
(applying Massachusetts law); Contoocook Valley Sch. Dist. v. Graphic Arts Mut. Ins. Co., 
788 A.2d 259, 261 (N.H. 2001); W. 56th St. Assoc. v. Greater N.Y. Mut. Ins. Co., 681 
N.Y.S.2d 523, 526 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998), as amended (Jan. 19, 1999); Am. Int’l. Specialty 
Lines Ins. Co. v. Rentech Steel LLC, 620 F.3d 558, 562-63 (5th Cir. 2010) (applying Texas 
law); W. Indem. Ins. Co. v. Am. Physicians Ins. Exch., 950 S.W.2d 185, 188 (Tex. App. 
1997); Builders Mut. Ins. Co. v. Parallel Design & Dev. LLC, 785 F. Supp. 2d 535, 543 
(E.D. Va. 2011). 
 156. See Donkers, supra note 5; supra Section II.A. 
 157. See generally Ins. Servs. Office Inc., Form No. CR 00 23 05 06, Commercial Crime 
Policy (Loss Sustained Form). 
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 Crime policies, on the other hand, do not 
cover Cyber Extortion.
159
 Thus the cyber policy must step in to insure this 
exposure, but it should be noted simultaneously that some cyber policies 
may not cover fraudulent instructions such as the one discussed in 
Medidata where larceny by trick is involved.
160
 Accordingly, CRE insureds 
should ensure that their crime and cyber coverages work in concordance 
with one another in order to fill these respective gaps, as well as to avoid 
overpayment of premiums for “double coverage.” 
D. Terrorism Insurance 
In the absence of help from crime coverage, CRE insureds might seek 
refuge from ransomware attacks through terrorism coverage. Under the 
                                                                                                                 
 158. Retail Ventures, Inc. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 691 F.3d 821, 
824, 833-34 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that under computer crime rider’s “resulting directly 
from” language, a proximate cause standard controlled, necessitating coverage for “incurred 
expenses for customer communications, public relations, . . . charge backs, card reissuance, 
account monitoring, and fines imposed by VISA/MasterCard”). 
 159. See Ins. Servs. Office Inc., Form No. CR 00 23 05 06, Commercial Crime Policy 
(Loss Sustained Form), Exclusions (f)(1)(a)-(e) (2005). This policy form states: 
Insuring Agreements . . . do not cover . . . (1) Loss of or damage to property 
after it has been transferred or surrendered to a person or place outside the 
“premises” or “banking premises”: . . . (c) As a result of a threat to do damage 
to any property; (d) As a result of a threat to introduce a denial of service attack 
into your computer system; (e) As a result of a threat to introduce a virus or 
other malicious instruction into your computer system which is designed to 
damage, destroy or corrupt data or computer programs stored within your 
computer system[.] 
Id. 
 160. See Am. Int’l Grp., Cyber Extortion Coverage Section, supra note 26, Exclusion 
3(a) (excluding from coverage “any payment for Loss: (a) arising out of, based upon or 
attributable to any dishonest, fraudulent, criminal or malicious act, error or omission, or any 
intentional or knowing violation of the law, if committed by any . . . (2) past or present 
employee . . .”); JLT Asset Management Cyber Policy, supra note 26, Exclusion 16 
(excluding “monetary value of any electronic fund transfers or transactions by or on behalf 
of the Insured which is lost, diminished or damaged during transfer from, into or between 
accounts”); JLT Asset Management Cyber Policy, supra note 26, Additional Coverage 
Section C(2), Definition 18 (tying Cyber Extortion coverage solely to “Extortion 
Demand(s),” which by definition must include a “threats” or a “series of threats”). But see 
Am. Int’l Grp., Event Management Coverage Section, supra note 26, Definition 2(l) 
(including “social engineering” within definition of “Privacy Event”); Evolve MGA Cyber 
Policy, supra note 33, Insuring Clause 2, Section A(e) (covering under Cyber Crime “any 
phishing, vishing or other social engineering attack against any employee or senior executive 
officer that results in the transfer of your funds to an unintended third party”). 
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Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA),
161
 as extended through 2020 
by the Terrorism Risk Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2015 
(TRIPRA),
162
 insurers must offer terrorism insurance with coverage at least 
as broad as the property or casualty policy being offered provides, and for 
its part, the federal government offers a financial backstop for the insurers 
in case a large loss does occur.
163
 The Terrorism Risk Insurance Program 
(TRIP) only provides this reinsurance, however, for certified “acts of 
terrorism,” which require, inter alia: 
$ a violent act dangerous to human life, property, or infrastructure;  
$ occurring within the United States (or at a U.S. mission or U.S. 
air carrier/flag vessel); 
$ committed by an individual(s) as part of an effort to coerce the 
civilian population of the United States or to influence the policy 
or affect the conduct of the United States Government by 
coercion;  
$ and property and casualty losses exceeding $5,000,000.164  
Because many insurers tie their coverage to this federal certification, the 
question of whether terrorism insurance will respond to a cyber event 
frequently revolves around whether the event meets the above definition.
165
  
U.S. Treasury Department guidance has confirmed that stand-alone cyber 
liability policies are subject to TRIA requirements because they generally are 
categorized as “property and casualty” rather than “[p]rofessional [e]rrors and 
[o]missions” policies, and therefore insurers must “make available” terrorism 
                                                                                                                 
 161. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322 
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 248 note, 15 U.S.C. § 6701 note, 28 U.S.C § 1610 note (2012)). 
 162. Terrorism Risk Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2015, H.R. 26, 114th 
Cong. § 101 (2015) (enacted). 
 163. See id. §§ 103(c), 105(a). TRIA requires insurers to offer terrorism coverage that 
“does not differ materially from the terms, amounts, and other coverage limitations 
applicable to losses arising from events other than acts of terrorism.” Id. § 103(c)(1)(B); see 
also EDWARD M. BLOOM & MICHAEL S. STRAUSS, MASSACHUSETTS CLE, INC., LEASE 
DRAFTING IN MASSACHUSETTS – INSURANCE, SUBROGATION, AND INDEMNITY (4th ed. 2017). 
 164. See 31 C.F.R. §§ 50.4(b), 50.60 (2017) (setting forth the definition of “act of 
terrorism” and the process under which an act is certified as an act of terrorism).  
 165. See Marianne Bonner, Do You Need Terrorism Insurance?, THE BALANCE: SMALL 
BUS. (Aug. 31, 2017), https://www.thebalance.com/do-you-need-terrorism-insurance-4102 
840. 
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coverage in connection with their sale of such policies.
166
 This requirement 
does not answer the question of whether terrorism coverage necessarily 
applies to a cyber event, however.
167
 It would be difficult in many cases to 
argue that certain cyber scammers are attempting “to coerce the civilian 
population of the United States or to influence the policy or affect the 
conduct of the United States Government by coercion” with their actions, 
although there are surely conceivable exceptions.
168
 Even in the event of the 
rare exception, cyber events are seldom “violent” acts, absent special facts—
indeed, part of the appeal of being a hacker is being able to make money 
while still hiding safely behind a computer screen without facing any threat 
of violence.
169
 To add another wrinkle, many terrorism forms contain 
endorsements excluding losses arising out of the malfunctioning, theft, 
corruption, or loss of use of or access to electronic data, just as property and 
CGL insurers now have done, leading to the final conclusion that seeking 
cyber coverage under the standard terrorism coverage offered with CGL and 
property policies is at best an uphill battle.
170
 Even specialized “kidnap, 
                                                                                                                 
 166. See Guidance Concerning Stand-Alone Cyber Liability Insurance Policies Under the 
Terrorism Risk Insurance Program, 81 Fed. Reg. 95,312 (Dec. 27, 2016). 
 167. See id. Such ambiguity is a pervasive problem for TRIA and related terrorism 
legislation, as a few practitioners have noted: “Terrorism legislation of all sorts defy 
cohesive analysis by their sheer volume. Even if one finds the pertinent statute, there are 
numerous other authorities, such as enactments specific to certain countries or even specific 
court cases, executive orders, and regulations.” VED P. NANDA, DAVID K. PANSIUS & BRYAN 
NEIHART, 1 LITIGATION OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES IN U.S. COURTS § 3:52, Westlaw 
(database updated Apr. 2018). 
 168. 31 C.F.R. § 50.4(b)(2017); see Daniel Wilson, ISIS-Linked Hacker Pleads Guilty In 
Cyberterror Case, LAW360 (June 17, 2016, 2:41 PM EDT), https://www.law360.com/ 
articles/808220/isis-linked-hacker-pleads-guilty-in-cyberterror-case (“Kosovo man pled 
guilty in Virginia federal court to charges that he hacked the personal details of around 1,300 
American troops and government personnel and put them at risk by posting that information 
on a Twitter account controlled by the Islamic State group, commonly called ISIS.”). 
 169. See John Winn & Kevin Govern, Identity Theft: Risks and Challenges to Business of 
Data Compromise, 28 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVT’L L. 49, 51 (2009) (“Cyber-theft is 
usually non-violent, has high profit margins, and incurs little or no risk of detection or 
prosecution.”). 
 170. See, e.g., UKP 602 1213 Endorsement (on file with author). This endorsement 
excludes: 
any loss, damage, cost or expense directly or indirectly caused by, consisting 
of, or resulting from any of the following, regardless of any other cause or 
event contributing concurrently or in any other sequence thereto: 
 1. Any functioning or malfunctioning of Electronic Data (including but not 
limited to any issues related to dates or date processing), the internet, an 
intranet, a private network, or any similar facility; 
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E. Directors’ & Officers’ Insurance 
Directors’ and officers’ (D&O) liability insurance policies provide 
coverage for claims against directors and officers that allege wrongful acts 
that those officials committed in their capacity as directors and officers of 
the insured company.
172
 Some D&O policy forms exclude coverage for 
claims arising out of “damage to or destruction of any data or tangible 
property, including loss of use thereof; [provided this exclusion does] not 
apply to Loss on account of any Claim arising from damage to, destruction 
of, loss of, or loss of use of, client records in an Insured’s possession.”
173
 
This exclusionary language is not nearly as far-reaching as that of the 
“Access Or Disclosure Of Confidential Or Personal Information” 
endorsement found in almost all CGL policies (discussed supra Section 
V.B), as it only excludes “damage to” or “destruction” of data, which does 
not necessarily occur during the course of a Privacy Breach Event. 
However, many D&O policies specifically exclude coverage for “invasion 
of privacy,” and courts generally enforce such exclusions, which could 
                                                                                                                 
 2. Any corruption, destruction, distortion, erasure, alteration, theft, or other 
loss or damage to Electronic Data; 
 3. Loss of use, access to, or functionality, all whether partial or entire, of 
Electronic Data, any computer or computer system, or any other device 
dependent upon any microchip or embedded logic, and any ensuing liability or 
failure of the Insured to conduct business. 
Id. 
 171. See Jeffrey Weinstein & Bruce Kaliner, Will Crisis Management Insurance Cover 
Ransomware?, LAW360 (Jan. 17, 2018, 4:44 PM EST), https://www.law360.com/insurance/ 
articles/1002995/will-crisis-management-insurance-cover-ransomware-. Although many of 
these policies have updated their language to expressly include computer-related events, 
there may be coverage hiccups in some instances where the following policy conditions are 
not met: (1) the threat is “communicated to the insured by person(s) who demand a ransom 
as a condition for not carrying out or ending the extortion incident”; and (2) “the insured is 
the intended victim of the triggering event.” Id. These conditions can be difficult because 
during these events the malware encryption often has already taken place before any threat is 
made; there is no “human” threat but rather only a computer message; and the “intended 
victim” is often not precise, as the ransomware does not necessarily target certain individuals 
but rather is designed to spread and infect. Id. 
 172. See Directors and Officers (D&O) Liability Insurance, INT’L RISK MGMT. INST., 
INC., https://www.irmi.com/online/insurance-glossary/terms/d/directors-and-officers-do-
liability-insurance.aspx (last visited Jan. 3, 2018). 
 173. See Chubb Ltd., Asset Management, D&O Form 26-10-0426 (1998) (on file with 
author). 
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The insured has prevailed in obtaining D&O coverage for a Privacy 
Breach Event when it (the insured) specifically purchases “Electronic Risk 
Liability” coverage. In First Bank of Delaware, Inc. v. Fidelity and Deposit 
Co. of Maryland, the insured subcontracted with Data Access Systems 
(DAS) to process certain credit card payments.
175
 Malicious actors hacked 
DAS’s servers, which led to millions of unauthorized withdrawals from 
customer accounts, placing First Bank out of compliance with the “Payment 
Card Industry Data Security Standard (‘PCI DSS’).”
176
 First Bank sought 
coverage under a provision of its D&O policy that covered electronic-risk 
liability, defined as “any unauthorized use of, or unauthorized access to, 
electronic data or software with a computer system.”
177
 The insurer argued 
that there was no covered “loss event” because the computer system was 
“not used to transact business on behalf of First Bank” (an element of the 
policy’s definition of “Computer System”), and that coverage should be 
denied under an exclusion for claims “based upon or attributable to or 
arising from the actual or purported fraudulent use by any person or entity 
of any data or in any credit, debit, charge, access, convenience, customer 
identification or other card, including, but not limited to, the card 
number.”
178
 The court sided with the insured, finding that a loss event did 
occur because DAS’s computers were used to conduct credit card 
transactions, fees from which were indeed part of First Bank’s 
“business.”
179
 It determined that every unauthorized use of or access to the 
insured’s electronic data or software would almost necessarily involve 




                                                                                                                 
 174. See L.A. Lakers, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., No. CV 14-7743 DMG (SHx), 2015 WL 
2088865, at *5-9 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2015); LAC Basketball Club Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., No. 
CV 14-00113 GAF (FFMx), 2014 WL 1623704 at *4-5 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2014); Res. 
Bank v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 503 F. Supp. 2d 789, 794-97 (E.D. Va. 2007). 
 175. First Bank of Del., Inc. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md., No. N11C-08-221 MMJ 
CCLD, 2013 WL 5858794, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 30, 2013). 
 176. Id. at *1-2. 
 177. Id. at *2, 5. 
 178. Id. at *4-8. 
 179. Id. at *5.  
 180. Id. at *5-9. With respect to the latter point, the court summarized:  
The Court finds that applying Exclusion M would swallow the coverage 
granted under Section 4.III(L)(1) for “any unauthorized use of, or unauthorized 
access to electronic data . . . with a computer system.” It is theoretically 
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VI. A Nightmare Scenario  
As one might be able to glean from this Article, there are myriad cyber 
scenarios that could present problems for CRE insureds.
181
 However, it is 
useful to walk through an example of a potential cyber event and provide a 
step-by-step explanation of the dangers involved and how insurers would 
respond. Drawing upon the real events as well as the policy form and 
endorsement language discussed in this Article, the following represents a 
possible cyber event for which CRE insureds should be sufficiently 
prepared. Although the example utilizes a multi-tenant office asset (and 
makes a number of other assumptions) for simplicity’s sake, it should be 
noted that there are nearly limitless distinct applications and exposures that 
could be discussed, all of which could have varying outcomes. 
Suppose Owner leases a Chicago office building to various entities, 
including Tenant. In the Lease, Tenant warrants that it is a small startup 
company that sells widgets and that it will use its portion of the leased 
premises as a corporate office. Tenant covenants that it will obtain and 
maintain various traditional insurance coverages during the Lease Term, 
including general liability insurance and insurance for its own personal 
property. Owner covenants that it will carry “all-risk” property insurance 
for the building, and Owner also happens to carry its own CGL, crime, 
terrorism, D&O, and cyber insurance. The Lease provides that Tenant will 
indemnify, defend, and hold Owner harmless for any and all claims and 
losses “in connection with or arising from the use or occupancy or manner 
of use or occupancy of the Premises or any injury or damage caused by 
Tenant.”
182
 Suppose further the Lease states that the HVAC at the building 
is to be handled through a centralized system that is ultimately controlled 
                                                                                                                 
possible that an example of non-fraudulent unauthorized use of data exists. 
However, in the context of this Policy, all unauthorized use could be, to some 
extent, fraudulent. The abstract possibility of some coverage surviving the 
fraud exclusion is not sufficient to persuade the Court to apply an exclusion 
that is almost entirely irreconcilable with the Loss Event coverage. 
Id. at *9. Note that Judge Johnston’s logic here is entirely consistent with this Article’s 
position on Medidata and related cases of computer fraud, discussed supra in Section V.C of 
this Article (“Commercial Crime Insurance”). The Fifth Circuit has also ruled in favor of the 
D&O insured in a case involving a hacking of credit card information leading to non-
compliance with the PCI DSS. See Spec’s Family Partners, Ltd. v. Hanover Ins. Co., No. 17-
20263, 2018 WL 3120794 (5th Cir., Jun. 25, 2018) (holding insurer wrongfully refused to 
defend insured because contractual liability exclusion did not explicitly excuse duty to 
defend). 
 181. See supra Sections III-IV. 
 182. See, e.g., OFFICE LEASE AGREEMENT, supra note 23. 
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by the Owner, but that Tenant will be charged proportional costs related to 
maintaining the HVAC as Additional Rent.
183
 Owner contracts with a third-
party HVAC vendor to handle all the heat and air conditioning and 
maintenance thereof. 
The HVAC system is “smart”—i.e., it includes various environmental 
sensors that monitor the system for abnormalities, energy consumption, and 
the need for service checkups and routine maintenance. Accordingly, the 
HVAC vendor that operates the system retains access rights to Owner’s 
computer network for carrying out these tasks.
184
 One day, malevolent 
hackers breach the HVAC system through a security vulnerability, thus 
giving them a foothold in Owner’s network and allowing them to exercise 
control of not only the HVAC systems, but also the building electrical 
systems, the Tenant’s Wi-Fi, and Tenant’s customer-payment systems.
185
 
The intrusion has thus occurred. That day, Owner and Tenant both receive 
messages from the hackers indicating that if they do not transfer $10,000 in 
Bitcoin to the hackers within forty-eight hours, the hackers will turn off the 
HVAC and electricity at the office building and release on the dark web the 
information of 10 million individuals found in Tenant’s payment-systems 
database. 
Unsure of whether this message is some kind of bluff or joke, Owner and 
Tenant work together during the next two days to address the problem by 
consulting law enforcement and hired computer experts. They begin the 
process of obtaining enough Bitcoin to pay the hackers in the event they 
end up needing to pay, but they assume the issue will be fixed and that 
                                                                                                                 
 183. See, e.g., W. MICHAEL BOND & JOHN GOLDMAN, OFFICE LEASE NEGOTIATIONS FOR 
TENANTS (2018) Westlaw 6-503-7910. 
 184. See Jaikumar Vijayan, Target Attack Shows Danger of Remotely Accessible HVAC 
Systems, COMPUTERWORLD (Feb. 7, 2014, 6:52 AM PT), https://www.computerworld.com/ 
article/2487452/cybercrime-hacking/target-attack-shows-danger-of-remotely-accessible-
hvac-systems.html.  
 185. This sort of breach through the HVAC system is exactly how the Target cyber 
attack was accomplished. Id.  
[T]hieves sent phishing emails to Fazio Mechanical Services, a third-party 
HVAC vendor that had access to Target’s computer systems, according to court 
documents. The emails were designed to trick users into clicking a link to 
download password-stealing malware. That gave Fazio’s Target network 
passwords to the hackers, who then used them to steal the retail giant’s 
customer data. 
Brandon Lowrey, Are Insurance Lawyers Ready for the ‘Year of the Phish’?, LAW360 (Feb. 
16, 2018 6:44 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1013330/are-insurance-lawyers-ready-
for-the-year-of-the-phish- (emphasis omitted). 
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business will continue smoothly
186
 (and furthermore, they are told that their 
Bitcoin transaction will take a few days to process).
187
 Unfortunately, the 
message is not a bluff, and the hackers do exactly as they threatened after 
forty-eight hours. The building’s HVAC and electricity are turned off, and 
the hackers release the personal data of millions of individuals over the dark 
web, the long-term effect of which is immeasurable. While there is no 
electricity, heat, or air conditioning, Tenant is unable to conduct business 
operations. At this point, data breach notification statutes are triggered, and 
Owner immediately retains a lawyer who specializes in data security and 
privacy, meanwhile putting all Owner and Tenant insurance carriers on 
notice of the issue. 
On the day of this calamitous occurrence, computer experts are quickly 
able to compile all of the names of the people potentially affected. Owner 
and Tenant both incur significant expenses notifying all affected parties of 
the breach, in compliance with all relevant data breach notification 
statutes,
188
 which is in addition to the fees they are paying the lawyer and 
the computer experts. The stakeholders agree at this point that it is probably 
best to just pay the hackers so that the building will be placed back into 
service. Owner pays the hackers that same day with the understanding that 
insurance likely will reimburse the cost, and failing that, Tenant’s 
indemnity obligations should kick in. Sadly, once the payment is made, the 
hackers do not turn the HVAC and electricity back on, but rather, demand 
another ransom payment. Owner and Tenant are both (understandably) 
incredibly frustrated at this point and refuse to pay out any more money to 
these awful hackers. After about three more weeks, the computer experts 
discover the vulnerability, fix it, and make changes sufficient to ensure that 
the hackers no longer have access to any of the computer systems. 
Normalcy is restored. 
The return of the HVAC and electricity is all well and good, but in the 
meantime, Owner has lost a month’s worth of rental income from each of 
its angry tenants whose lawyers advised that they withhold rent payments 
because Owner failed to maintain the building in a tenantable manner for 
nearly an entire month due to its failure to adequately secure the HVAC 
                                                                                                                 
 186. One survey found that only “24.6% of companies would be willing to pay a ransom 
to hackers.” CLOUD SEC. ALL. & SKYHIGH, THE CLOUD BALANCING ACT FOR IT: BETWEEN 
PROMISE AND PERIL 2 (2016), http://info.skyhighnetworks.com/rs/274-AUP-214/images/WP 
%20CSA%20Survey%20Cloud%20Balancing%20Act%200116.pdf. 
 187. See Why Does a Buy Take So Long?, COINBASE, https://support.coinbase.com/ 
customer/portal/articles/1392022-why-does-a-buy-take-so-long (last visited Sept. 5, 2018). 
 188. See supra Section IV.B. 
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(for which it was responsible under the Lease) and maintain the 
electricity.
189
 Tenant, a small startup company, is unable to withstand the 
deadly combined blow of one month without widget-selling and the 
tarnished reputation from the release of its customers’ PII, so it eventually 
files for bankruptcy. Predictably, it also breaks the lease, and Owner now 
must find a replacement tenant, not to mention the expenses incurred 
through the ineffective Bitcoin payment, data breach notification 
compliance, attorneys’ fees, and payment for the computer experts. To 
make matters worse, plaintiffs’ lawyers have discovered that the breach that 
caused the release of PII originated in the HVAC, which was the Owner’s 
responsibility under the Lease. Given that Tenant is rendered insolvent and 
that the HVAC vendor does not have pockets as deep as the Owner’s, the 
plaintiffs’ lawyers organize a big-money class action lawsuit against 
Owner.  
Tenant’s insurance policies would not assist with any of these costs 
because (1) the class action is not against Tenant, so the insurer has no duty 
to defend (not to mention the applicability of the Access Or Disclosure Of 
Confidential Or Personal Information And Data-Related Liability 
exclusion); (2) the HVAC is not Tenant’s personal property, but rather, it is 
Owner’s property, so Tenant’s property policy would not respond (not to 
mention any applicable electronic data exclusions); and (3) Owner did not 
require Tenant to carry any cyber insurance, so there would be no cyber 
coverage. Furthermore, Tenant is insolvent, so any attempts by Owner to 
attain satisfaction on Tenant’s indemnity obligations will inevitably be 
relegated to the back of the line with the other unsecured creditors in 
bankruptcy. Even if Tenant had remained solvent, it is certainly arguable 
whether a hacking of Owner’s HVAC would give rise to any obligations on 
behalf of Tenant under the Lease language.
190
 Could Owner seek any 
defense or indemnification from its own insurance? Let us assume that 
throughout this whole process, Owner dutifully and accurately has kept its 
insurance carriers abreast of everything with the hope of obtaining coverage 
for all of these expenses.  
                                                                                                                 
 189. See supra Section III.B; note 62 and accompanying text. 
 190. See OFFICE LEASE AGREEMENT, supra note 23 (stating in lease language that Tenant 
will indemnify for claims and losses “in connection with or arising from the use or 
occupancy or manner of use or occupancy of the Premises or any injury or damage caused 
by Tenant”) (emphasis added). Here, the breach of the HVAC did not arise out of Tenant’s 
use or occupancy or manner of use or occupancy, and all losses were arguably caused by the 
acts or omissions of Owner or his HVAC vendor, not Tenant. 
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The business interruption coverage on Owner’s all-risk property policy 
would likely not provide any coverage for lost rent or income, because 
although building systems were turned off, there was no specified covered 
peril or physical damage to trigger the policy.
191
 The CGL carrier would not 
tender a defense in relation to the class action, as the action arises out of 
“Access Or Disclosure Of Confidential Or Personal Information And Data-
Related Liability.”
192
 Owner’s crime and terrorism carriers will deny the 
claim for the massive Bitcoin payment because standard crime policies do 
not cover Cyber Extortion, and absent other facts, it is unlikely that this 
hacking would be deemed a certified act of terrorism.
193
 If shareholders 
sued Owner’s officers and directors for breach of duty of care, then 
theoretically Owner’s D&O coverage could provide defense and possibly 
indemnity depending on the policy language, but only as to that particular 
lawsuit.
194
 Thus, Owner’s cyber policy would almost certainly be the last 
resort for indemnification for these losses. 
First, any adequate cyber policy should cover all of Owner’s data breach 
notification costs, as well as the fees paid to the computer experts.
195
 The 
Cyber Extortion coverage provisions of most cyber policies should cover 
the eventual payment of the Bitcoin.
196
 Defense of the class action lawsuit 
should also be covered, assuming the policy does not have a blanket 
exclusion for consumer-protection class actions that the carrier uses to deny 
the claim.
197
 So, under the average cyber policy, the insured Owner would 
likely recoup some of the costs associated with this unfortunate event. 
As to the lost rental income stemming from the angry tenants and the 
insolvent Tenant, however, it is likely that many cyber insurers would deny 
coverage for all the costs related thereto because many of the business-
interruption costs here arguably were caused by a “Privacy Breach Event” 
                                                                                                                 
 191. See supra Section V.A. 
 192. See supra Section V.B. 
 193. See supra Sections V.C-D. 
 194. See supra Sections V.E. Owner would have to ensure that its D&O policy does not 
contain any relevant exclusion, such as one for “invasion of privacy.” See supra Section 
V.E. 
 195. See RAND Study, supra note 27, at 13; Am. Int’l Grp., Event Management 
Coverage Section, supra note 26, Definition 2(h); Am. Int’l Grp., Reputation Guard 
Coverage Section, supra note 26, Definition 2(f); Evolve MGA Cyber Policy, supra note 33, 
Insuring Clause 1, Sections A, B; JLT Asset Management Cyber Policy, supra note 26, 
Privacy Breach, Privacy Breach Management B.1; Chubb Cyber Policy, supra note 33, 
Cyber Incident Response Expenses Definition. 
 196. See Chubb Cyber Policy, supra note 33, Extortion Expenses Definition. 
 197. See sources cited supra note 195. 
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or a “Cyber Extortion Event” rather than a “System Event.”
198
 Although the 
hackers did shut systems down in this hypothetical, they also threatened 
release of PII through ransomware, giving the insurer plenty of room to 
argue that business-interruption coverage was never triggered at all. Given 
that the building at issue is a multi-tenant office building in Chicago, the 
amount lost to Owner if the insurer denies this coverage is likely in the 
millions of dollars. Furthermore, if it ever becomes apparent that the 
hackers in question were operating at the behest of North Korea or a 
terrorist group, the insurer could deny coverage altogether if the policy 
contained broad terrorism or war exclusion wording.
199
 As the reader 
undoubtedly now recognizes, traditional insurance policies are not adequate 
to cover events like these, and indeed even the cyber policy coverage itself 
can be tenuous, a reality that underscores the importance of buying the right 
policy with the most expansive possible coverage. 
This hypothetical obviously presents something of a nightmare scenario, 
but it is not terribly far-fetched. All of the events in this hypothetical are 
drawn from actual cyber events and related litigation, most of which were 
discussed in this Article. CRE insureds would do well to take these threats 
seriously and attempt to address them with robust cybersecurity, contractual 
risk transfer, and well-negotiated cyber insurance. Until more case law 
comes down to determine what types of events are really covered by cyber 
insurance, rigorous diligence before policies are bound and before claims 
arise is the best risk mitigation approach. For example, the Lease in this 
hypothetical should have included a cyber insurance requirement for all 
tenants as well as indemnification language indicating that tenants would 
indemnify, defend, and hold Owner harmless for any costs arising out of 
any cyber events, including those related to the HVAC. Further, Owner’s 
cyber policy should have adequately addressed the provision of indemnity 
for business interruption caused by Privacy Breach Events and Cyber 
Extortion Events rather than only System Events.  
                                                                                                                 
 198. See supra Sections II.C, III.B; JLT Asset Management Cyber Policy, supra note 26, 
Definitions 34, 39; see also Am. Int’l Grp., Network Interruption Coverage Section, supra 
note 26, Section 1 (Insuring Agreement), Definition 2(k) (tying business interruption 
coverage to “Security Failure”); Am. Int’l Grp., Security and Privacy Coverage Section, 
supra note 26, Section 1 (Insuring Agreement), Definitions 2(l) and 2(p) (tying liability 
coverage to either “Security Failure” or “Privacy Event”); but see Evolve MGA Cyber 
Policy, supra note 33, Insuring Clauses 1 & 3, Definition 11 (tying both first- and third-party 
coverages to broadly defined “cyber event”). 
 199. See supra Section III.C. 
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Given the acuteness of cyber threats, it is critical that risk managers and 
insurance counsel analyze any and all potential gaps between current 
policies and the market’s available cyber options when shopping for 
coverage.
200
 CRE insureds involved with the construction or ownership of 
smart buildings are likely to be most concerned about property damage, 
business interruption, and liability to third parties arising from cyber 
events.
201
 Insurance coverage for these dangers that might have historically 
existed under property, CGL, crime, terrorism, and D&O policies (i.e., 
“silent cyber”) has already been or soon will be phased out from those 
policies and segregated into cyber insurance products.
202
 Regrettably, many 
of the cyber solutions that the insurance industry offers can also be too 
narrow in their scope in that they too do not guarantee sufficient coverage 
for these risks.
203
 From a smart building owner’s perspective, broadly 











 and other terms 




Still, CRE stakeholders must ensure that a risk assessment and coverage 
gap analysis takes place, using the analysis thereof as the basis for their 
negotiations with cyber carriers to obtain coverage to fill those specific 
gaps and obtain the necessary coverage to the extent available.
210
 Insureds 
must also emphasize stronger negotiation and contractual risk transfer to 
ensure that any tenants or property managers maintaining the data at smart 
buildings purchase cyber insurance and agree to indemnify the owner for 
losses arising out of any cyber events.
211
 Cyber insurance carriers, 
meanwhile, should focus their efforts on offering products that are more 
narrowly tailored to CRE needs and the risks associated with smart 
                                                                                                                 
 200. See supra Section V. 
 201. See supra Sections III-IV. 
 202. See supra Sections V-VI; see also supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
 203. See supra Sections III-IV. 
 204. See supra Section III.A; note 56 and accompanying text. 
 205. See supra Section V.B; note 139 and accompanying text. 
 206. See supra Section IV.A. 
 207. See supra Section III.C. 
 208. See supra Section III.A; note 57 and accompanying text. 
 209. See supra Sections III-IV. 
 210. This is possible because cyber insurance is relatively negotiable due to its difficulty 
in pricing. See supra Section II.D. 
 211. See supra Sections V-VI. 
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buildings, so that they can actually offer additional protection that is worth 
purchasing as these new perils continue to emerge. Otherwise, CRE might 
continue to stay away from cyber insurance products where there is little to 
no articulable benefit to purchasing them.
212
 Nevertheless, because the 
insurance industry has already begun the process of excluding any possible 
“silent cyber” from the traditional policies, obtainment and maintenance of 
cyber insurance will soon undoubtedly become more of a necessity, and 




                                                                                                                 
 212. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. Innovative products may already be starting 
to accomplish these goals. See Willis Towers Watson Launches Tailored Cyberinsurance 
Coverage for Construction Industry, WILLIS TOWERS WATSON (July 10, 2018), 
https://www.willistowerswatson.com/en-US/press/2018/07/tailored-cyberinsurance-coverage-
for-construction-industry; see also Jeff Sistrunk, Apple, Cisco Venture Could Fuel 
Cyberinsurance Market Surge, LAW360 (Feb. 9, 2018, 7:11 PM EST), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/1010553/apple-cisco-venture-could-fuel-cyberinsurance-
market-surge. 
 213. See supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
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Cyber Coverage Checklist for CRE
214
 Based on Current Case Law and 
Prevalent Policy Forms and Endorsements 
____ LOST INCOME, REVENUE, REPUTATION / BUSINESS INTERRUPTION INCLUDED215 
____ BUSINESS INTERRUPTION WAITING PERIOD IS 8 HOURS OR LESS216 
____ NO EXCLUSION FOR BODILY INJURY, OR IF THERE IS AN EXCLUSION, CARVEBACK 
FOR MENTAL ANGUISH/EMOTIONAL DISTRESS217 
____ EXCLUSION FOR PROPERTY DAMAGE CARVED BACK TO ALLOW COVERAGE FOR 
BRICKING AND DAMAGE TO INTANGIBLE PROPERTY (I.E., ELECTRONIC DATA)218  
____ EXCLUSION FOR CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY CARVED BACK TO PROVIDE COVERAGE 
FOR PCI FINES, LIABILITY THAT WOULD HAVE ARISEN IN ABSENCE OF CONTRACT, 
AND CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION TO SECURE/MAINTAIN PII219 
____ SECURITIES CLAIMS/BREACH OF SECURITIES LAWS EXCLUSION CARVED BACK TO 
ALLOW COVERAGE FOR SUCH CLAIMS THAT ARISE OUT OF CYBERSECURITY/ 
CYBER LIABILITY220 
____ NO TERRORISM EXCLUSION DEFINING TERRORISM AS BEING ANY ATTACK 
CONNECTED TO AN “IDEOLOGY” OR OTHER VAGUE TERMS221 
____ WAR EXCLUSION DOES NOT APPLY TO CYBERTERRORISM222 
____ AUTOMATIC COVERAGE FOR MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS223 
                                                                                                                 
 214. Please note that depending on the size and nature of the various exposures to the 
insured, as well as the costliness of adding/removing certain items, some of these terms 
should not necessarily be “deal breakers” during the negotiation process for every insured. 
Rather, this list is an attempt to provide considerations insureds should seek to confirm with 
their insurance brokers and carriers as part of the negotiation and decision-making process 
when signing up with a cyber insurance program. 
 215. See supra Section III.B. 
 216. See supra Section II.C. Note, the shortest waiting period the author has seen offered 
is six hours. 
 217. See supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
 218. See supra Section III.A. 
 219. See supra Section IV.A. 
 220. See supra Section IV.C. 
 221. See supra Section III.C. 
 222. See supra Section III.C. 
 223. Although not discussed in this Article at great length, this is a critical component of 
proper cyber coverage for real estate companies because new assets are going to need to be 
added to the policy throughout the term. A CRE insured does not want a negotiation to occur 
or have a substantial additional premium be charged every single time a new property is 
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____ CONFIRM GDPR COVERAGE (TO THE EXTENT ENFORCEABLE)224 
____ RETENTION/DEDUCTIBLE NOT GREATER THAN $25,000225 
____ VIOLATION OF CONSUMER PROTECTION STATUTE NOT EXCLUDED (OR, IF 
EXCLUDED, SUCH EXCLUSION IS SPECIFICALLY CARVED BACK FOR SUITS/ACTIONS 
BROUGHT UNDER THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT)226  
____ CRYPTOCURRENCY PROVIDED AS PART OF CYBER EXTORTION/RANSOMWARE 
COVERAGE (WITH NO WAITING PERIOD)227 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
added to the portfolio. 
 224. See supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
 225. This is the market standard as of this writing. 
 226. See supra Section IV.A. 
 227. See supra note 187 and accompanying text. 
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